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11. InTRoDuCTIon anD oVeRVIew 
The eaCC sTuDY
The purpose of the Economics of Adaptation to Climate 
Change (EACC) study is to better understand and esti-
mate the true costs of adapting to climate change in less 
developed countries. The study is made up of three 
components. At a global level, there is an analysis of costs 
across different economic sectors. At a country level, 
there is an economic component and a social component, 
taking place in a set of representative case study coun-
tries. Mozambique is one of these countries.
The economic component of the Mozambique country 
study has the objective of identifying a set of robust 
adaptation options for the country, then comparing the 
direct costs and benefits of those options. To calculate 
the costs, the team has utilized a computable general 
equilibrium method. This method is data intensive—it 
requires a good model of the national economy—but 
can generate an estimate of the costs of targeted 
government interventions, in terms of reduced overall 
economic growth, once those effects have trickled 
through the labor and capital markets and the economy 
has returned to equilibrium. The economic team 
considered a range of adaptation options, which were 
gathered from the literature and from interactions with 
national level policy makers and other stakeholders.
The social component of the Mozambique country 
study has a less precisely defined purpose, and this 
reflects the relative ambiguity of the term “social vulner-
ability” in the first place. Crudely stated, the concept of 
social vulnerability rests on the premise that the extent 
to which climate change harms people depends on a 
broad set of factors having to do with individual 
empowerment to weather storms and to make changes, 
and the extent to which social interactions contribute to 
or detract from that empowerment (Adger 1999; Brooks 
et al. 2005). So one purpose of this study is to find out 
what individual and social factors make people more or 
less vulnerable, and to identify adaptation strategies that 
would reduce that vulnerability (Cutter 2001). The idea 
of social vulnerability also rests on the premise that 
within any community there are some people who are 
especially vulnerable, and a just society should take steps 
to help them in particular. So a second purpose of this 
study of social vulnerability and adaptation is to identify 
those livelihood activities and people likely to be most 
harmed by climate change, and then identify realistic 
ways of improving their situations (Osbahr et al. 2008).
This study builds on a recent assessment of social 
vulnerability in Mozambique, conducted as part of a 
study led by the National Disaster Management Agency 
(INGC). Patrick Nussbaumer took a standard social 
vulnerability framework from the literature—previously 
used to rank African countries (Vincent 2004; Vincent 
2007)—that relied on a set of a dozen indicators. He 
estimated future trends in these indicators consistent 
with two development scenarios—the A2 and B1 
Special Report on Emissions Scenarios (SRES) of the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(Nakicenovic and Swart 2000)—to see where 
Mozambique will be in 50 years compared to now and 
compared to other African countries behind which it 
currently lags. Figure 1 shows the results. As is evident, 
the social vulnerability of Mozambique by 2060 looks 
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better than that of South Africa today. That is good 
news for people who think that South Africa is in rela-
tively good shape. It would suggest, perhaps, that to 
estimate future climate change impacts on people in 
Mozambique in the future we should think about the 
effects on people in South Africa today.
That study, however, was relatively silent on the issue of 
adaptation. A key issue for this study, then, is to move 
forward and reach conclusions about adaptation based 
on an appraisal of social vulnerability.
In this study, we have taken the deliberate approach of 
considering development first, and then putting climate 
change on top of that, rather than the other way around. 
This means identifying where the country and its people 
are headed and would like to go, and associating numer-
ous activities and steps with the achievement of that 
progress. Then, we have looked at where climate change 
may interfere with those activities and steps, and hence 
threaten the development vision. Adaptations are things 
that allow the development vision to proceed. The alter-
native approach, which is what has arguably guided most 
research efforts to date, is to start with the identification 
of climate impacts, and see how these might negatively 
affect society as it is structured now. After having done 
so, one then sees how future development pathways may 
exacerbate or ameliorate this situation. 
If one could be completely “rational” or “logical” in our 
analysis, the two approaches would end up in the same 
place. But we are not that perfect, and as researchers 
and as stakeholders tend to become anchored in 
particular visions of the world. By considering devel-
opment first, we try to free our minds to consider a 
future for the country that is quite different than the 
present. Perhaps there will be no subsistence farmers 
in 50 years, just like subsistence farming vanished 
from North America and Europe in the 20th Century. 
If that is the case, then we free our minds from 
considering the impacts on subsistence farmers, and 
instead consider the impacts of people’s transition 
from being subsistence farmers into being something 
else. 
Another purpose of this study, then, is to inform the 
process of vulnerability assessment, which continues to 
evolve to suit the needs of policy makers more 
completely (Patt et al. 2008). We are interested in seeing 
whether taking a development-first approach is even 
possible: It seems nice when written on paper, but can 
people really think this way when called to work on a 
study with climate change in its title? If we can take the 
approach, and stick to it, do we in fact arrive at results 
that are different from the more traditional impacts-led 
approach? This is a crucial issue to evaluate in the 
conclusion of this report.
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note: The two graphs show the relative contribution of different factors to the reduction of social vulnerability, relying on a theoretically informed model. 
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The PRoCess of The sTuDY
In planning this study, the World Bank staff designed a 
five-step methodology, following an ambitious schedule. 
Phase 1 would summarize existing literature on differ-
ent livelihood groups, including their relative vulnerabil-
ities. It would then engage in discussions with a wide 
range of stakeholders to provide details on hotspots of 
vulnerability (i.e., by livelihood groups and by location), 
including a detailed description of that vulnerability and 
existing adaptive capacity. Phase 2 would conduct a 
number of workshops in order to develop adaptation 
scenarios. Phase 3 would analyze the social effects of 
the different scenarios. Phase 4 would add to the social 
analysis by incorporating economic analysis, using the 
results of computable general equilibrium models to 
identify distributions of costs and benefits. Phase 5, 
taking place contemporaneously, would be the prepara-
tion of a final country case study report so the results 
could be evaluated in conjunction with the other 
countries. 
Actual work on the study followed the same general 
outline to a large extent, but the scheduling changed a 
great deal, due to unanticipated difficulties finalizing 
contracts, scheduling meetings, and resolving payment 
issues. The only structural result of the change in sched-
uling was that the Phase 2 workshops preceded the 
stakeholder discussions designed for Phase 1; this had 
little practical significance. Thus, the first part of Phase 
1 involved conducting an institutional analysis, an iden-
tification of socio-geographic zones, and a review of 
existing livelihood assessments in those zones. All of 
this was included in an inception report, submitted by 
the lead consultant in mid-February 2009. Phase 2 
consisted of a set of “participatory scenario develop-
ment” (PSD) workshops, under the guidance of the 
Mozambique country team and in coordination with a 
consultant team from Canada, ESSA Technologies, and 
the International Institute for Sustainable Development 
(IISD). ESSA Technologies and IISD organized a trial 
PSD workshop in Ghana in June 2009, at which final 
scheduling decisions were made, namely to hold three 
workshops in Mozambique in July and August. 
Following these workshops, in September, the country 
team conducted interviews and surveys in a targeted set 
of field sites, in order to supplement the existing litera-
ture. Results from this fieldwork were available 
for analysis in November. Phases 3, 4, and 5 took place 
iteratively, commencing in mid-November and 
completed in January 2010. This report is a result of 
that work.
The ouTlIne of ThIs RePoRT
This report follows the chronology of the work in the 
country study as that work actually took place.
• The first section contains a review of existing 
knowledge about vulnerability and adaptation in 
Mozambique, including the institutional landscape 
within which adaptation planning has taken place. 
Much of the material in section 2 has been copied 
from the inception report. 
• The second section describes the general approach 
to conducting original research within this project. 
This methodology was agreed upon over the course 
of several months, after the inception report had 
been submitted, and concluded with discussions in 
Ghana in June. It includes a map of the locations 
where fieldwork ultimately took place and the guid-
ing questions for the work. 
• The third section describes the results from the 
three PSD workshops. Results from the first of 
these workshops—which took place in Xai Xai—
had already been submitted to the World Bank by 
this consultant, while the results from the third 
workshop—in Maputo—had been submitted by 
ESSA and IISD. The second workshop, in Beira, 
took place under the direction of the local 
Mozambique project team, and they supplied 
detailed notes about that workshop to this consul-
tant. Hence, section 4 pulls these three sets of 
results together into one place, allowing for compar-
ing across the three workshops. 
• The fourth section describes the results from the 
fieldwork, which took place in late August and 
early September 2009. That fieldwork consisted of 
three activities: a set of institutional interviews, a 
set of focus group discussions with representative 
stakeholder groups, and a household survey. The 
results here are based on the field notes from the 
first two activities, translated from Portuguese into 
English by an additional consultant in Washington 
DC, and on a data file containing the results from 
the household survey. 
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• Finally, the fifth section synthesizes the findings 
and draws out the key conclusions that are relevant 
for policy. 
There are three annexes. Annex 1 consists of this 
consultant’s identification of the important lessons from 
each of the focus group discussions. These help to paint 
a more complete picture of how participants conceptu-
alized climate change vulnerability and adaptation. 
Annex 2 consists of the household survey instrument. It 
is in Portuguese, which is the language in which it was 
written, and from which it has not been translated. 
Annex 3 consists of the field report from the lead local 
consultant, Raul Varela.
52. soCIal DIMensIons of ClIMaTe 
Change In MozaMbIque
exPeCTeD PhYsICal IMPaCTs of 
ClIMaTe Change In MozaMbIque
Current hazards
As with many other countries in Africa (Boko et al. 
2007), Mozambique's vulnerability to climate change is 
in large part defined by its vulnerability to natural 
hazards (República de Moçambique 2007; Ehrhart and 
Twena 2006; Comité de Conselheiros 2003; Nkomo et 
al. 2006; and Mavie 2003). The three main hazards that 
Mozambique faces are droughts, floods, and tropical 
cyclones. Figure 2 plots out the numbers of lives lost, 
and the number of people otherwise affected (needing 
some sort of assistance) from these three hazards over 
the period 1990–2007. It is taken from the database of 
the Center for Research on the Epidemiology of 
Disasters (CRED). Each of the dots represents a single 
country in Africa, while Mozambique and its immedi-
ate neighbors are labeled. As can be seen, Mozambique 
has suffered among the greatest effects from natural 
disasters in Africa. 
Table 1 lists the most important disasters recorded in 
Mozambique, sorted according to the number of people 
affected and requiring some sort of assistance during 
and after the event. Droughts have affected the most 
people and caused the most deaths. However, one needs 
to be cautious about how many people have been killed 
by droughts; for example, the drought of 1981 is 
attributed with 100,000 deaths, but it is unclear how 
many of these deaths were due in large part to the 
ongoing civil war, which made relief efforts problematic. 
Floods, while not typically affecting as many people, 
typically do cause loss of life but do cause even greater 
losses in terms of infrastructure. The flood of 2000, for 
example, caused an estimated $419 million worth of 
damage and set back the country’s development by 
years. Storms, most prominently tropical cyclones, are 
the third major hazard, and also cause a great deal of 
infrastructure loss. Epidemics are a secondary hazard 
often brought on by one of the other three, either 
fIguRe 2. nuMbeR of PeoPle affeCTeD oR 
kIlleD bY naTuRal DIsasTeRs In afRICan 
CounTRIes, 1990–2007
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note: Mozambique has suffered among the highest losses of african coun-
tries in both cases. 
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because of a deterioration in safe drinking water provi-
sion or the spread of tropical disease vectors.
One of the most important determinants of agricultural 
suitability is rainfall. Figure 3a is taken from the 
National Adaptation Program of Action (NAPA, p. 68) 
and shows average annual precipitation in millimeters of 
rainfall. It shows that most of the country receives an 
average of between 600 and 1,200 mm of rainfall annu-
ally, which is generally sufficient for maize or cassava 
cultivation. Some areas—mountainous regions in the 
north—receive more than this, while the low-lying 
inland region in the south receives substantially less.
Corresponding to the variability in rainfall is the risk of 
drought. Figure 3b shows the risk of drought through-
out the country. The highest risk levels are, not surpris-
ingly, where the average annual rainfall is also the 
lowest, and hence the chances of receiving insufficient 
rainfall to support crop growth is quite high. Also high 
in risk are several districts in the inland central region. 
These also receive relatively little rainfall.
While usually costing fewer lives than droughts, floods 
are often the most visible hazard hitting the country. 
The most notable recent example was in 2000. In early 
February 2000, heavy rains started to fall across much of 
southern Africa, hitting southern Mozambique the 
hardest. On February 9 the capital of Mozambique, 
Maputo, was flooded, with slums in the peri-urban areas 
hardest hit, and the road north to Beira underwater. 
The rains continued, and on February 11 the Limpopo 
River, north of Maputo, broke its banks, contaminating 
Table 1. MosT IMPoRTanT DIsasTeR TYPes 
In TeRMs of nuMbeRs affeCTeD anD 
kIlleD 
Disaster
Number of 
events
Number 
affected Number killed
drought 10 16,444,000 100,200
flood 20 9,039,000 1,900
storms 17 3,002,400 700
Epidemic 18 314,000 2,500
Source: IngC.
fIguRes 3a anD 3b. PReCIPITaTIon anD 
DRoughT
3a. 
3b 
Sources: República de Moçambique, National Adaptation Program of Action 
(NAPA) 2007, p. 39, and INGC.
note: The hash-marked areas in figure 3a are those where stakeholder inter-
views were conducted in support of the naPa, which is not relevant for this 
study. figure 3b shows the drought risk mapped throughout the country, indi-
cating the highest risk levels in the inland south—where average precipitation 
is also the lowest—as well as the inland central region of the country, where 
average precipitation is higher. 
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the water supply and bringing dysentery to the local 
population. The worst came on February 22, when 
Cyclone Eline hit the Mozambique coast near Beira, 
with winds of 260 km/h and torrential rains. Eline 
worked its way inland, dropping huge quantities of 
water on the Limpopo River catchment area. That 
water followed its way down the Limpopo River valley, 
and on February 27 flash floods occurred in the Gaza 
Province of Mozambique, arriving suddenly and bury-
ing the low-lying farmlands in the Chókwe and Xai Xai 
Districts under four to eight meters of water. Residents 
climbed trees and rooftops, but with only a few boats 
and less than a dozen helicopters available to evacuate 
over 100,000 people, over 7,000 people were stranded in 
trees for several days. Eight hundred people died, 
hundreds of thousands were left homeless, and 2 million 
were affected. Over 90 percent of the irrigation systems 
in Mozambique were lost. In the immediate aftermath 
of the floods, losses were estimated at $273 million in 
direct costs, and $428 million in optimal standard 
reconstruction costs (World Bank 2000).
Figure 4a shows the exposure to flooding in terms of 
actual floodplains (taken from INGC), while Figure 4b 
shows flood vulnerability at the district level. It shows 
the Limpopo River floodplain to be the most risky 
region in the country, followed by the floodplains near 
the Buzi and Zambezi rivers. Also at risk are coastal 
regions in the central and northern regions of the coun-
try, due to tropical cyclones. It should be noted that the 
tidal range in the central region of the country is excep-
tionally high due to tidal currents in the Mozambique 
Channel, which could account for the risk levels in the 
central region, outside of the Buzi River lowlands.
how the hazards will Change because of Climate 
Change
A critical question is how these risks will change in the 
future because of climate change. Here, the results are 
somewhat ambiguous, as well as regionally differenti-
ated. One reason for the ambiguity is that 
Mozambique straddles an area where the effects of 
climate change are likely to go in opposite directions. 
In southern Africa, the general trend as a result of 
climate change is for drier conditions. Certainly this is 
expected to be the case for Zimbabwe, and large parts 
of South Africa. In East Africa, by contrast, the 
fIguRes 4a anD 4b. flooD RIsk MaPs
4a. 
4b 
Sources: República de Moçambique, National Adaptation Program of Action 
(NAPA) 2007; sundararajan and williams 2008, p. 21; and IngC project doc-
ument. 
note: The highest risk levels are for the limpopo River basin, with high risk lev-
els as well for the buzi and zambezi river basins. Coastal regions in the north 
are also at risk from sea water inundation, particularly during tropical cyclones. 
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general trend to be expected with climate change is for 
wetter conditions. This is the case for Kenya and 
Tanzania. Mozambique, of course, borders both 
regions, and given uncertainty about where the line 
between the two directions of change will fall, it is very 
difficult to say what direction of change any part of the 
country will experience. That being said, it is more 
likely that the southern part of the country will experi-
ence a trend toward drier conditions, while the north-
ern part of the country will experience a trend toward 
wetter conditions. But there is a great amount of 
uncertainty. Another reason for the uncertainty lies in 
the paucity of long-time series of historical climate 
data for Mozambique and the neighboring countries; 
this makes it hard to calibrate climate models, and 
hence to obtain reliable estimates for the future.
The best assessment to date of these changes was in a 
recent report carried out by INGC in 2008 and 2009 
(Asante et al. 2009). The climate modeling team from 
the University of Cape Town in South Africa 
conducted a comprehensive downscaling of data from 
climate models across the region, and had access to the 
full set of Mozambique weather station data. This 
report made projections for changes in temperature and 
average precipitation, as primary impacts. As secondary 
impacts, the report made projections for changes in soil 
moisture availability (influenced by both temperature 
and precipitation) and flooding (influenced by precipi-
tation and mapped out onto a statistical flooding 
model). 
Figure 5 shows these projected changes that could affect 
the risk of drought. It is quite clear that temperature 
will rise. It also seems reasonably clear that most of the 
country—with the exception of the south—will experi-
ence a rise in average precipitation. These two effects 
oppose each other in terms of how they influence 
potential soil moisture, however, and so it is less clear 
what the combined effects will be. Except in the south, 
the median estimates are for slight increases in soil 
moisture, while in all cases the range of estimates from 
the ensemble of seven models indicates that the direc-
tion of change could go either way. What will this mean 
for drought risk? It is difficult to say, because drought 
risk depends not just on average rainfall and soil mois-
ture, but also on the frequency with which there are 
severe negative deviations. A secondary analysis of the 
INGC data suggested a slight increase, perhaps as much 
as 15 percent, in the frequency of drought, especially 
over the southern part of the country. Again, however, 
the range of estimates (derived from the range of 
models used) crossed into the range of a possible 
decrease in drought risk.
Figure 6 shows results from the INGC flood mapping 
work. The team used a statistical flood model—based 
not on exact hydrological characteristics and digital 
elevation map, but rather on the correlation between 
past climatic conditions and reported flooding—to 
estimate how the risk would change in the future. As 
the figure caption indicates, there is a great amount of 
uncertainty about the direction of change: Flood risk 
could increase in the future, or it could decrease. It is 
very difficult to say more. It is also difficult to identify 
clear regional trends within the country.
Finally, the INGC study attempted to characterize the 
changing risk levels due to tropical cyclones. Here, it is 
possible to identify the likely direction of change, but due 
to a lack of data it is very difficult to quantify that 
change. Both models and empirical data suggest a posi-
tive correlation between sea surface temperatures and 
cyclone intensity but no obvious correlation between sea 
surface temperatures and cyclone frequency. Given that 
sea surface temperatures are likely to increase (McDonald 
et al. 2005.; Bengtsson et al. 2007; and Emanuel et al. 
2008), one can be confident that there will be a shift 
toward stronger cyclones, but not necessarily any change 
in their overall frequency. However, since damages are 
related to the cube of the wind speed, strong cyclones 
cause a much higher amount of damage than do weaker 
cyclones. Overall, one can expect more damages due to 
cyclones in the future.
naTIonal PlannIng foR ClIMaTe 
Change:  naPa anD oTheR sTRaTegIes
To understand the policy and institutional landscape 
in Mozambique related to climate change vulnerabil-
ity and adaptation, it is essential to pay attention to 
the degree of activity that is driven by external funders 
and donors on the one hand, and Mozambique’s 
participation in the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and 
commitments to achieve the Millennium 
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Development Goals (MDGs) on the other. In this 
section, we provide an overview of the activities that 
have been carried out to date. 
One of the main drivers of planning activities in 
Mozambique in the area of climate vulnerability 
reductions is the country’s adoption of the MDGs and 
UNFCCC. In September 2000, Mozambique was one of 
189 countries to formally adopt the MDGs. As part of 
its commitment to cut absolute poverty in half by 2015 
(MDG 1), the government committed to developing a 
strategy for attainment, known generally as the Poverty 
fIguRes 5a–5D. PRojeCTIons MaDe bY The IngC sTuDY
Source: asante et al.( 2009). 
note: each chart shows projected monthly changes from the baseline period (1960–2000) until 2050 (green) and 2100 (blue). The shaded region represents the 
range captured by an ensemble of the seven climate models, while the solid line represents the median estimate of those models. figure 5a shows projections for 
rainfall, in terms of mm per day. figure 5b shows changes in maximum temperature, in terms of °C. figure 5c shows changes in potential evapotranspiration, in 
terms of mm per day, and derived from temperature estimates and land cover data. figure 5d shows the potential moisture index (indication soil water availability) 
derived from the other three estimates. 
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Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) and in Mozambique 
by the Portuguese equivalent of PARPA. Preparation and 
approval of PRSPs on an ongoing basis is a precondition 
for continued support from the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) and the International Development 
Association (IDA), the branch of the World Bank 
responsible for helping the world’s poorest countries; the 
two organizations are involved in funding and approving 
the PARPA and monitoring its implementation. The 
government completed the first PARPA in 2001 
(República de Moçambique 2001–2005) and the second, 
PARPA II, in 2006 (República de Moçambique 2006–
2009). The Ministry of Planning and Finance (MPF) 
coordinated the preparation of PARPA material, which 
occurred across numerous government ministries and 
agencies and received assistance from a long list of 
national, international, and nongovernmental donors. 
IMF and IDA commented on the PARPA, noting that it 
advanced planning on poverty in Mozambique signifi-
cantly, and yet left room for improvement in the area of 
vulnerability, and approved it as a satisfactory prerequisite 
for continued IMF and IDA support (IMF and IDA 
2001). A similar approval process occurred for PARPA 
II, noting that it represented a significant improvement 
over the original PARPA (IMF and Republic of 
Mozambique 2007). Related documents suggest that the 
implementation of activities under the PARPA is 
progressing, but the extent to which this is taking place is 
unclear.
Mozambique ratified the UNFCCC in 1995, and as part 
of this committed to preparing National 
Communications, led by the Ministry for the 
Coordination of Environmental Affairs (MICOA), the 
UNFCCC focal point for the government of 
Mozambique. The first national communication was 
completed in 2003 (MICOA 2003), but due to a 
protracted period of governmental approval, submitted 
only in 2006. The initial national communication 
contains required information on greenhouse gas emis-
sions, mitigation options, climate change vulnerability, 
and adaptation options. Under the UNFCCC, least 
developed countries (LDCs) receive financial assistance 
from the Global Environment Facility (GEF) to prepare 
National Adaptation Programs of Action (NAPAs). 
MICOA began this process in 2003, at the time it 
completed its initial national communication. It 
completed work on the NAPA in 2007 and submitted it 
to the UNFCCC in 2008 (República de Moçambique 
2007). Once the NAPA has been submitted to the 
UNFCCC, the country becomes eligible to draw from 
the LDC fund, also managed by the GEF, to implement 
the planned activities. It is unclear whether any steps 
have been taken toward implementation of the NAPA.
The NAPA represents the main area of planning for 
climate adaptation within the country (República de 
Moçambique 2007). Its conclusions are entirely consistent 
with a view of Mozambique’s adaptation needs being 
driven be the three hazards of drought, flood, and cyclone. 
The four strategic options listed in the NAPA were:
fIguRe 6. Changes In flooD RIsk
Source: asante et al. 2009. 
note: Three different global climate models were used, and their results fed 
into a statistical flood model. The wettest of the climate models was the IPsl 
model, and this resulted in estimates of increased flood risks in most of the 
river basins in Mozambique. The driest of the models, gfDl, indicated a 
decrease in the frequency of flooding events across most river basins. The 
median model, eChaM, indicated a mix, with many areas experiencing a 
slight increase in risk levels, and some experiencing a slight decrease. 
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• Strengthening the early warning system for f loods, 
droughts, and tropical cyclones;
• Strengthening the capacities of agricultural produc-
ers to cope with climate change;
• Reduction of climate change impacts in coastal 
zones; and 
• Management of water resources under climate 
change.
There has also been nationally driven planning. In 1999, 
the government adopted the National Disaster 
Management Policy. This creates a set of priorities and 
objectives, including better coordination between disas-
ter planning and other government objectives, such as 
economic development. The policy established the 
National Institute for Disaster Management (INGC) 
and the Coordination Council for Disaster 
Management (CCGC). INGC is an independent legal 
entity, originally located within the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs but since 2005 in the Ministry of State 
Administration. Its general competencies are to coordi-
nate disaster management planning, information, and 
activities; to deal with donors in the area of disaster 
mitigation, planning, or management; and to increase 
the flow of information, both with neighboring coun-
tries and with the Mozambique public, related to disas-
ter management. It has offices in each of the provinces, 
with the exception of the Maputo City Province. The 
CCGC is a council made up of representatives from a 
number of ministries, and with one representative from 
INGC. In addition to making sure that all necessary 
ministries are involved in disaster management and 
recovery efforts, the CCGC is charged with the 
approval of regularly updated disaster management 
plans. The first of these was completed in 1999, but a 
second one has not yet been developed. A more 
complete picture of the institutional history and frame-
work for disaster planning and management can be 
found in a report developed and funded by the United 
Nations Human Settlements Program, UNEP, and the 
GEF (Muianga 2007).
To a large extent, the 2009 INGC study already 
mentioned (Asante et al. 2009) represents the most 
extensive nationally driven assessment of climate change 
hazards in Mozambique and can serve as the basis for 
additional planning. That study did not contain work on 
developing policy guidelines, however. In addition to 
these planning activities of INGC, there have been a 
number of initiatives carried out by other agencies and 
ministries. These include contingency plans as a result 
of seasonal climate forecasts issued at the Southern 
African Regional Climate Outlook Forum (Muianga 
2007; Lucio et al. 2007); mapping activities such as the 
Limpopo Atlas completed by CENACARTA with 
assistance from FEWS-NET; and others.
oVeRVIew of soCIal VulneRabIl ITY  
In  MozaMbIque
There have been a large number of place-based studies 
looking at social vulnerability in Mozambique, employ-
ing both bottom-up and top-down strategies. 
bottom-up Research studies. 
Reporting on work conducted by the German Agency 
for Technical Cooperation (GTZ), Ferguson (2005) 
analyzed the natural disaster risk in the Búzi District in 
Sofala Province. In collaboration with the Catholic 
University of Mozambique, a participatory methodol-
ogy was used to identify the population at risk from 
different disaster types. The analysis suggested that 
different types of natural hazards threatened the safety 
and livelihoods of approximately one-third of the popu-
lation. The study found that human activities—agricul-
ture and deforestation—had degraded the study area’s 
natural resources (forest and savannah). Ferguson 
argued that the population is particularly vulnerable due 
to a combination of factors, some related to the location 
of the area and its topography, and others related to the 
culture and socioeconomic conditions, and that it is this 
vulnerability that turns a hazard into a disaster. 
Table 2 summarizes the factors leading to an increased 
hazard on the one hand and the vulnerability of the 
population on the other. The study chronicled adapta-
tion measures that had reduced vulnerability: the 
construction of new settlements on higher ground and 
away from the river; the rebuilding of damaged infra-
structure with due account of the need for being more 
resistant to cyclones; and the improvement of disaster 
preparedness through simulation exercises that practiced 
the implementation of early warning systems. As more 
frequent extreme climate events can be expected in the 
future, and considering the fact that relatively little can 
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be done to reduce the hazard, vulnerability reduction is 
of utmost importance to minimize casualties and mate-
rial losses. In this regard, Ferguson saw an important 
role for the government to play at different levels, and 
argued that disaster risk management should be an inte-
gral part of rural development strategies.
Carmo Vaz (2000) reviewed the major flood episodes 
that occurred in Mozambique since independence in 
1975 in the Maputo, Umbeluzi, Incomati, Limpopo, 
Save, Buzi, Pungoé, and Zambezi river basins, and 
analyzed the measures taken to mitigate floods in 
Mozambique. The author classified mitigation strategies 
into two categories: structural and non-structural. 
Structural flood mitigation measures included dams, 
levees, flooding areas, and river training, whereas non-
structural measures comprised flood zoning, flood 
management, flood warning systems, emergency plans, 
raising awareness, and insurance. In regard to dams, the 
review noted that dams with sufficient storage capacity 
can play a significant role in attenuating floods. While 
all major reservoirs in Mozambique incorporate a flood 
reserve in their operating, Carmo Vaz underlined the 
potential perverse effect of dams as a means of 
mitigating floods. Indeed, for small floods that are 
absorbed by the dams, the preparedness of socioeco-
nomic systems might decrease and thus be hit even 
harder in the case of a major flood, since large floods 
can exceed by far the storage capacity of the reservoirs. 
Nevertheless, Carmo Vaz argued for including flood 
control in the planning, design, and construction stages 
of all new dams.
As part of a more general inquiry into adaptation to 
climate extreme events, Mirza (2003) reviewed the causes 
of high vulnerability in Mozambique and characterized 
extreme weather events in two categories: (1) primary 
climatic events such as floods, droughts, tropical cyclones, 
heat waves, or cold waves, as well as coastal storms and 
storm-generated surges; and (2) secondary events such as 
malnutrition or under-nutrition and hunger, outbreaks of 
diseases or epidemics, rural and urban water shortages, 
crop plantation failure or harvest failure, and landslides, 
mudflows, and saline water intrusion. 
The author highlighted nine dimensions and areas for 
potential improvement. First, socioeconomic conditions 
were judged important factors to vulnerability. Forty 
Table 2. RIsk anD VulneRabIlITY faCToRs aCCoRDIng To naTuRal DIsasTeRs  
In The búzI DIsTRICT 
Hazard Vulnerability
Flood • high precipitations (either in district or upstream)
• high tide can temporarily obstruct the flow of the Rio 
Búzi to the sea
• low level of education
• proximity of towns to the river
• Absence of high elevation point for escape
• most people cannot swim and do not have enough 
boats
• non-availability of warning system
Cyclones and 
tropical storms
• cyclones develop over the indian ocean or the 
mozambique channel when the water temperature is 
warm; wind speeds can reach up to 300km/h, and 
are usually accompanied by heavy rain (which could 
simultaneously cause flooding)
• threat especially for settlements close to coast
(same as above)
• traditional houses are not designed and built to resist 
cyclones
Drought • climatic variation in mozambique can lead to one or 
more years of precipitation below average
• influence of El niño-southern oscillations, which 
cause high temperature and low precipitation in 
Eastern Africa, while la niña causes heavy rains and 
floods
• intrusion of saline seawater into the groundwater and 
the soils during high tide when the water level of the 
Búzi River is low
• population living on subsistence agriculture; changes 
in climatic conditions exert significant impacts on 
socioeconomic systems 
• incapacity of storing supplies as seed for the following 
year in case of insufficient yields
• Alternative sources of food, such as fishing, small 
livestock, honey, do not allow for substitution
• Almost no irrigation system is in place (comité de 
conselheiros 2003), neither traditional nor modern
Source: ferguson (2005).
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percent of the population live under the abject poverty 
line (less than $1 per day), and another 40 percent live on 
less than $2 per day. Second, Mozambique’s debt repay-
ment is drawing substantial financial resources from the 
national budget, which could otherwise be allocated 
toward promoting development. Third, most of the water 
causing devastating floods actually originates from 
abroad. Fourth, the primary objective of water dams is 
electricity generation, while a multipurpose management 
also would consider flood prevention. Fifth, design crite-
ria for embankment construction typically consider 5–10 
year flood return periods, rather than floods of higher 
magnitude and greater return periods. Sixth, rural areas 
are generally more affected by flooding than urban areas 
because they are more dependent on agriculture. Seventh, 
communication was poor during past natural disasters, 
thus preventing quick and effective humanitarian inter-
ventions. Eighth, although Mozambique had a rapidly 
growing economy, living conditions for the majority of 
the population had not significantly improved due to 
marked inequality in the distribution of resources. Ninth, 
human and material resources proved to be inadequate to 
deal with the major flood in 2000.
Patt and Schröter (2008) conducted a study funded by 
the World Bank on perceptions of changing vulnerabil-
ity and risk levels. They analyzed three separate sets of 
data. First, they held workshops with farmers and local 
leaders in villages that had suffered from the Limpopo 
River flood of 2000, and with national level policy 
makers in Maputo. What they observed in the two sets 
of discussions was an apparent mismatch in concern 
over the primary risks: Farmers seemed less worried 
about the risks from future flooding events than they 
were about how the shortcomings in the previous recov-
ery efforts remained apparent, while policy makers 
seemed unconcerned with the potential unintended 
consequences of their adaptation strategies. For exam-
ple, in the policy-makers’ workshop, the researchers 
divided participants into a number of working groups 
and asked each to identify several adaptation strategies, 
the barriers to successful implementation of those strat-
egies, and the potential negative consequences of those 
strategies were they to be fully implemented. All of the 
groups were able to come up with the first and second 
lists. However, it was only the working group that 
contained the least expertise on climate adaptation that 
was actually able to envision negative consequences of 
climate adaptation; the other groups simply listed addi-
tional barriers to implementation. 
Second, the researchers conducted a survey asking 
policy makers and farmers to indicate the risk levels 
from climate-related and non-climate-related events. In 
general, policy makers saw the climate-related events as 
most risky, while the farmers saw the non-climate-
related events as riskier. For example, there are different 
perceptions between farmers and policy makers as to 
which risks are presently becoming more severe. This in 
turn could explain why some adaptation measures, such 
as resettlement into villages outside of the floodplain 
could thus be viewed as unattractive because they could 
worsen the non-climate risks (crime, for example). 
Finally, the researchers conducted a household survey, 
again in two villages in the Limpopo floodplain, in which 
they explored people’s perception of climate change and 
the causes for the changes they observed. They found 
that while most people had observed changes, they did 
not attribute the changes to issues of pollution coming 
from outside their community or country. Rather, those 
surveyed believed that they had caused some of the 
changes by ignoring traditional practices. The researchers 
suggested that this could lead to an unwillingness to 
engage in adaptive behavior, since adaptive behavior 
would represent yet another departure from tradition and 
hence result in even more unwanted changes.
Eriksen et al. (2008) conducted a comparative analysis of 
three bottom-up vulnerability assessments in 
Mozambique and South Africa. The results are interest-
ing both for the findings of the underlying assessments 
and for the added analysis comparing them. First, a 
number of agencies throughout southern Africa—includ-
ing the Southern African Development Community 
(SADC), the UK Department for International 
Development (DFID), and the Famine Early Warning 
System Network (FEWS-NET)—formed vulnerability 
assessment committees (VACs) for Mozambique, 
Malawi, and several other SADC countries. The objec-
tive was to develop a coordinated system to monitor 
ongoing food insecurity, allowing for cross-national 
comparisons and the prioritization of relief aid. The 
assessments started in 2002 with the proposition that 
droughts were the primary trigger for food insecurity, 
which implied that rainfall and crop monitoring were the 
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most important activities to engage in as part of a food 
insecurity monitoring effort. Later, the VACs came to 
the conclusion that indeed there were multiple triggering 
factors for food insecurity, and hence it was essential to 
monitor a wider variety of indicators and take response 
measures that consider not just immediate hunger, but 
also the patterns of development that were the precursors 
to food insecurity.
 The second assessment considered was the Economic 
Impacts of Climate Change vulnerability assessment, 
led by the World Bank in cooperation with the 
Norwegian climate research institute CICERO, the 
University of Oslo, Rutgers University, and the 
University Eduardo Mondlane. A key focus of this 
assessment was on the potential interaction between 
climate change and economic development. The assess-
ment found that climate change tended to have the 
greatest negative effects precisely on those communities 
and households that lacked integration into markets 
and hence were failing to participate in economic 
growth. One explanation for this could be that market 
integration allows households to be more flexible in 
their livelihood strategies, and hence more adaptive to 
climate change impacts. The policy implication from 
this study was that greater attention to economic inte-
gration could be an important means of reducing the 
vulnerability to climate change.
The third assessment, on disaster risk management, was 
led by the German Agency for Technical Cooperation 
(GTZ), in cooperation with the Mozambique Red 
Cross (CVM) and the Catholic University of 
Mozambique (Ferguson 2005). This assessment focused 
on the Búzi River basin in central Mozambique and 
looked closely at conditions on the ground. The 
researchers engaged in two activities: First, they engaged 
in mapping to identify the need for specific infrastruc-
ture that would mitigate the effects of droughts and 
floods; second, they identified household- and commu-
nity-level coping mechanisms and infrastructure. A 
major implication of their study is that policy interven-
tions need to build upon local knowledge and local 
practice, rather than interfere with it.
In comparing the results of these three assessments, 
Eriksen et al. (2008) reached two main conclusions. 
First, it is essential to consider the multiple factors that 
give rise to vulnerability: not just the drought or flood 
that is the triggering event for food insecurity or a loss 
of life, but the more fundamental patterns of develop-
ment that exacerbate or mediate the effects of these risk 
factors on human suffering. Put into Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) language, this is 
saying that assessments need to consider not just expo-
sure, but also sensitivity. The specific factors that make 
people more sensitive are isolation from markets, a lack 
of information and education, and a lack of basic infra-
structure. Second, it is essential to consider vulnerability 
as it operates at the household and community levels, 
taking into account household- and community-level 
knowledge and infrastructure. This is another way of 
focusing on the need to assess adaptive capacity, viewing 
the household and community as the initial repositories 
of this capacity. Policy interventions need to build on, 
rather than act against or interfere with, this capacity.
studies using the household food economy 
approach
In Mozambique, the process of assessing household 
food economies has been undertaken by the Famine 
Early Warning Systems Network (FEWS.NET), first in 
2002, and then again more recently since 2008. The 
2002 assessment resulted first in a breakdown of the 
country into 39 food economy zones. Essentially, these 
were regions with a similar economic context within 
which people operated, and thus a homogenous set of 
threats to that economic context (FEWS-NET 2002b). 
For each zone, the report provides details on the admin-
istrative boundaries and the populations of men and 
women within those boundaries. It then describes the 
main sources of food, the main sources of income, and 
the main risks. It does not describe wealth levels or 
household food economies within each zone.
The 2002 assessment also resulted in two detailed food 
economy baseline profiles for the Alto Limpopo zone 
(FEWS-NET 2002a), and for the coastal Nampula and 
Southern Cabo Delgado zone (FEWS-NET 2002c). 
These provide more detailed information on actual 
household food economies within each zone and were 
meant as a proof of concept for putting the five-step 
methodology concept to use within an operational 
agency. In 2008, FEWS.NET resumed work on this, 
based on an updated set of assessment guidelines (FEG 
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Consulting and Save the Children 2008), and has so far 
prepared an additional set of five detailed livelihood 
profiles (FEWS-NET 2008a, 2008b, 2008c, 2008d, 
2008e). These profiles provide a richly detailed set of 
information on the zones that have been covered so far. 
Connected with the work in 2008, FEWS-NET also 
prepared in cooperation with the United States Agency 
for International Development (USAID) office for 
Mozambique a set of four briefing papers, in which 
they analyzed the impacts of the global food crisis on 
rural Mozambican households (USAID Mozambique 
2008), assessing the vulnerability of the poor, the link 
between household food economies and vulnerability to 
natural disasters, and the utility of the HEA approach 
for development. These reports are rather brief, and 
provide an overview of the factors that relate entitle-
ment, food security, and vulnerability.
Top-down approaches
Finally, Patt and Nussbaumer (2009) conducted a study 
of social vulnerability as part of the larger INGC study 
on disaster risk (Asante et al. 2009). The authors exam-
ined the combined effects of both climatic drivers of 
vulnerability and socioeconomic drivers. To pull the two 
together, they conducted a cross-sectional study of 
losses resulting from climate-related disasters across the 
globe and built a statistical model that relied on both 
climate variables and socioeconomic drivers, particularly 
the Human Development Index. This part of the study 
was similar to what had been done previously in the 
context of several global studies (Brooks et al. 2005; 
Brooks et al. 2004; UNDP 2004; and Yohe and Tol 
2002). They then assembled projections for both sets of 
variables—the climate ones from the team members in 
the INGC study, and the socioeconomic ones from 
IPCC and UNDP scenarios that had been assembled—
in order to reach conclusions about likely changes over 
time. Their results suggested that the socioeconomic 
drivers could play an important role in driving vulnera-
bility. Figure 7 shows their projections for vulnerability. 
As the figure caption indicates, the upper figure shows 
the risk of being affected by a climate-related hazard, 
while the lower figure shows the risk of being killed. 
The three solid lines in each figure show estimates 
obtained using a linear extrapolation of past disaster 
frequency trends as the climatic driver in the future. 
The shaded regions, by contrast, derive climate projec-
tions from the INGC modeling results. For both, the 
black lines and shaded regions correspond to a socio-
economic scenario with no changes from the present, 
such as in income or fertility; the blue lines and shaded 
regions correspond to the IPCC A2 scenario; and the 
red lines and regions correspond to the IPCC B1 
scenario. The A2 scenario generally suggests less 
economic growth in Mozambique, and less change in 
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note: figure 7a shows estimates for the change in the risk of being affected 
by a climate-related hazard, while figure 7b shows the change in the risk of 
being killed by a climate-related hazard. The figures contain three socioeco-
nomic scenarios and two climate scenarios. 
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other development factors such as life expectancy and 
fertility. It does, however, project higher urbanization 
rates. The B1 scenario projects greater improvements 
in human development and lower rates of 
urbanization. 
What can one learn from this study? First, there is a lot 
of uncertainty about future vulnerability that is 
accounted for by uncertainty about future climate 
trends. The linear extrapolation of observed disaster 
trends leads to much higher estimates of risk levels than 
do the climate models. Which is right? Given the diffi-
culty of modeling extreme event risks, it is hard to say. 
Second, the effects of the faster improvement in human 
development associated with the B1 scenario are also 
quite large. Indeed, human development projections 
from the B1 scenario could lead to falling risk levels by 
the middle of the century.
Taking the bottom-up and top-down studies together, it 
is clear that social and socioeconomic factors do play a 
large role in determining vulnerability to climate change 
now, and will in the future. The bottom-up studies 
suggest that factors such as people’s perceptions and 
attributions of the underlying risk, and the information 
that they have at their disposal to respond to changes in 
risk levels, could influence their adaptive capacity. The 
studies also suggest that socially and economically 
marginalized groups will have a more difficult time 
coping with and adapting to climate variability and 
change and will therefore experience higher vulnerabil-
ity. The top-down study shows that a rising economic 
tide could raise the overall ship of Mozambique, making 
it more resilient and less vulnerable to climate change. 
However, this study says nothing about how the socio-
economic changes will reach the most vulnerable 
communities within the country.
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3. ReseaRCh MeThoDologY
ReseaRCh sTRaTegY anD quesTIons
Both the guiding questions and the research strategy for 
this study were, to a large extent, set in advance in the 
World Bank’s original scoping materials for all country 
studies. The questions were to identify the special 
concerns faced by the most vulnerable populations in 
Mozambique and to identify adaptation strategies and 
pathways that would best respond to those concerns. At 
a project meeting held in Accra in June 2009, this was 
further refined to identify the extent to which the prior-
ities set forth in existing adaptation plans–such as 
NAPA–would differ if one were to give special consid-
eration to the needs of the most vulnerable communi-
ties. To a large extent, this would require identifying 
how the concerns of the most vulnerable differ from 
those of the population in general. 
To address these questions, the research strategy 
included four key steps:
• A review of primary and secondary literature, sup-
plemented by stakeholder interviews, to identify 
both existing knowledge about social vulnerability 
in Mozambique and current and planned efforts to 
reduce that vulnerability.
• A review of climate impact studies, including map-
ping, to identify key hotspots of social vulnerability 
and a set of sociogeographic zones.
• A series of participatory scenario development 
(PSD) workshops, with the last one held in the 
national capital and involving national-level 
stakeholders, to identify the most vulnerable groups 
and appropriate adaptation pathways.
• Fieldwork in vulnerability hotspots to validate the 
results from the PSD workshops. The fieldwork 
was to consist of three methods: (1) a set of institu-
tional interviews with representatives from key 
organizations; (2) a set of focus group discussions 
with people from different socioeconomic strata; 
and (3) a set of household surveys, with a sampling 
method to capture variance in the anticipated driv-
ers of social vulnerability.
The first of these steps was carried out quickly by the 
lead consultant, with the results reported in the incep-
tion report. The inception report also proposed a set of 
sociogeographic zones. Following this, the local 
consultant suggested refinements to these zones, and 
engaged in GIS-based analysis to identify hotspots 
within these zones. Work then slowed, as bureaucratic 
complexities made the process of releasing funds for 
the PSD workshops and fieldwork difficult. Eventually, 
the team held three PSD workshops in July and 
August, with technical assistance from IISD and 
ESSA technologies. Fieldwork commenced in August, 
and was finished in mid-September. The initial 
processing of data yielded field notes by the end of 
September. These required translation into English, 
which took place by mid-October. Quantitative data 
was available in a form suitable for analysis by 
mid-November.
sITe seleCTIon anD saMPlIng
In the inception report, the lead consultant proposed a 
set of six zones. These are:
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• Coastal urban areas, most importantly Maputo and 
Beira. This zone is marked by highly differential 
vulnerability across income groups, with large peri-
urban areas vulnerable to f looding from both rivers 
and the ocean.
• The non-urban coastal strip. This zone is marked 
by high vulnerability to coastal f looding and storm 
surges from tropical cyclones, as well as threats of 
erosion. It is relatively food secure, with low rates of 
poverty.
• The districts containing the Limpopo River valley 
upstream of Xai Xai. This zone is unique in being 
exposed to two very different threats at a high level: 
river f looding and drought. It has a relatively high 
population density, and hence high numbers of 
impoverished people. There has been extensive 
studying of this region, and so it is possible to 
access a great deal of baseline data.
• The other river valleys, in particular in the Buzi 
and Zambezi river valleys, which are highly suscep-
tible to f lood risk and to f looding caused by tropical 
cyclones, but are less susceptible to droughts. The 
Buzi River region has also been extensively studied, 
as part of German-funded activities, and so there is 
no shortage of baseline data.
• The drought-prone inland areas, in particular in 
the south. These areas are highly susceptible to 
drought—indeed years of adequate rainfall to sup-
port agriculture are the exception, rather than the 
rule—while the people are often dependent on 
remittances for survival. Population densities in 
these regions are low.
• The inland areas of higher agricultural productivity, 
including the highly productive and populated areas 
in Zambézia. These areas are perhaps the least vul-
nerable in Mozambique, facing adequate rainfall 
most years and no extreme risks from flooding or 
tropical cyclones. They are somewhat heterogeneous 
in terms of poverty rates and food security. The 
highly productive regions in Zambézia stand out for 
their high population density and relatively low 
vulnerability.
Further discussions among the entire project team 
agreed on these zones. The local consultant then 
engaged in two processes. First, he delineated them 
precisely, in terms of particular districts covered within 
each. Second, and more importantly, he identified 
districts within each zone that constituted risk hotspots. 
To do so, he first engaged in mapping the different 
levels of risk, for each of the major classes of risk, and 
overlaying areas of high population on these. Figure 8 
shows the result of this. It was agreed to combine this 
analysis with the maps of the zones, in order to identify 
one or two districts within each zone that represented 
hotspots for that zone. Within each of these districts, 
the fieldwork would take place at multiple administrative 
posts, in order to capture potential variation within the 
district.
Budgetary factors and time constraints, ultimately, 
limited the number of districts considered in the field 
study. Figure 9 shows the locations of these sites. 
In terms of the PSD workshops, it had been originally 
planned to hold one regional workshop, and one 
national workshop, back to back. During discussions in 
June in Accra, the project team decided instead to hold 
three regional workshops, one each in the northern, 
central, and southern regions of the country, followed by 
a national workshop in Maputo. Time constraints led to 
a scaling back; ultimately the team held regional work-
shops in Xai Xai and Beira, inviting stakeholders from 
both the central and northern regions of the country to 
the Beira workshop. A national-level workshop in 
Maputo followed.
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fIguRe 8. soCIal VulneRabIlITY hoTsPoTs
Source: authors.
note: The district map identifies areas where risks from drought, flood, and cyclone are considered to be high or very high. 
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4. PaRTICIPaToRY sCenaRIo 
DeVeloPMenT woRkshoP ResulTs
PsD woRkshoPs:  DesIgn oVeRVIew
The team organized three PSD workshops. The origi-
nal intention was to conduct two one-day PSD work-
shops in each country. One of these would focus on 
involving local-level stakeholders, while the other 
would focus on involving national-level stakeholders. 
To assist in the development of these workshops, the 
World Bank issued a contract to a consortium of two 
Canadian partners—ESSA Technologies and the 
International Institute for Sustainable Development 
(IISD)—to develop a workshop program, prepare visual 
materials for the workshops, and in selected countries 
(so-called Tier 1 countries), attend and help to facili-
tate the workshops themselves. In the first of the 
African Tier 1 countries to hold a workshop—
Ghana—the consultants from Mozambique and 
Ethiopia also attended, in order to observe the work-
shop in operation, so as to be able to repeat its key 
aspects. This Ghana workshop—involving national-
level stakeholders—took place in June 2009.
The consultants attending the Ghana workshop were 
not entirely satisfied. Meeting the day after the work-
shop, they reached several new conclusions. First, it was 
essential to place more emphasis within the workshops 
on different stakeholder groups in order to stimulate 
more in-depth thinking about development and climate 
concerns. At the Ghana workshop, participants had 
broken out according to their geographical expertise. It 
was decided that for future PSD workshops, they 
would break out according to their sectoral or liveli-
hood group expertise or interest, and indeed the identi-
fication of relevant sectors or livelihood groups could 
be an outcome in and of itself of the workshop. Second, 
the consultants decided that for Mozambique it would 
be useful to have more than one local-stakeholder-level 
workshop, for two reasons. Holding a series of work-
shops in different regions of the country could reduce 
travel distances for workshop participants. Also, differ-
ent regions of the country have different climate, devel-
opment, and adaptation concerns, and it would be 
useful to address these in separate workshops. 
Originally the plan was to have three such workshops, 
but due to organizational constraints the number 
changed to two. The third conclusion was that the 
workshops would be over two days, rather than one. 
This would give more time for in-depth discussion. 
Fourth, ESSA and IISD would provide assistance to 
the Mozambique team, as with the Tier 1 countries, 
attending at least the first workshop. Given language 
abilities, the consultants Raul Varela and Isilda 
Nhantumbo would jointly facilitate both workshops in 
Portuguese, with additional assistance from students 
recruited from the University of Eduardo Mondlane in 
Maputo.
There were, however, several important differences in 
the designs of the three workshops. The first two 
workshops—in Xai Xai and Beira—each followed an 
eight-step procedure, while the national workshop in 
Maputo followed a seven-step approach. These appear 
in Figure 10. The two procedures differed in several 
respects. Most importantly, the eight-step approach 
was built much more around the idea of imagining a 
future vision for the country, and people’s lives in that 
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future. After having done this, participants identified 
ways that climate change could interfere with that 
vision, and then thought of the appropriate adaptations 
that could lessen this interference. The seven-step 
approach, by contrast, was built much more around 
considering specific climate impacts, and identifying 
appropriate adaptation pathways to lessen those 
impacts. Roughly speaking, the eight-step approach 
reflects a development-oriented view of adaptation 
(making the development pathway more robust to 
climate change), whereas the seven-step approach 
reflected a climate-oriented view of adaptation (reduce 
the negative consequences associated with a range of 
potential climate impacts).
The second main difference was in the manner in 
which breakout groups were defined, and here the major 
difference was between the Beira workshop and the 
other two. In all workshops, participants identified early 
on where they were from, and where their geographical 
area of greatest expertise lay (Figure 11). In Xai Xai and 
Maputo, participants then divided into breakout groups 
along the lines of different economic activities or 
groups. These were agriculture and ranching, agrofor-
estry, fishing, and commerce. In the Maputo workshop, 
the agriculture and ranching participants in turn divided 
into two groups, one concerned with subsistence activity 
and the other with commercial activity. In the Beira 
workshop, the breakout groups divided according to 
geographic location, with a separate group for each of 
the provinces represented at the workshop. 
These different approaches led to very different units of 
analysis. In the activity-oriented approach, discussion 
focused on the constraints and opportunities people face 
while earning their livelihoods in particular ways, with 
the recognition that climate change threatens some 
activities more than others. The participants discussed 
governance issues at a more general level, with some-
what less attention to how different provinces would 
necessarily implement different types of policies, or on 
the combinations of policies needed to address the 
needs of different economic groups. In the geography-
oriented approach, discussion focused more on the port-
folios of activities present within each province, and the 
need for policies at the provincial and district levels to 
deal with the impacts of climate across multiple 
economic activities. The important justification for this 
was to stimulate a different type of thinking, one 
focused on practical solutions that people working 
together along existing jurisdictional lines could address. 
A critical question was whether changing the framing 
of the unit of analysis for adaptation—from activities in 
the Xai Xai workshop to geographic regions in the 
Beira workshop—led to differences in substantive 
outcomes.
oVeRVIew of ResulTs fRoM loCal anD 
naTIonal woRkshoPs
The two local workshops were especially interesting, 
because unlike many other workshops they focused 
participants’ attention first on development, and only 
then on the potential threats that climate would impose 
on that development. This was especially the case in the 
Xai Xai workshops, where each of the breakout groups 
considered how development would proceed for a 
particular sector of society. The result was somewhat 
less the case in the Beira workshop, where the separa-
tion into provincial breakout groups did not allow for 
discussion to be as specific on different societal sectors, 
and instead the discussion was more general in terms of 
improved quality of life for all people.
xai xai key Insights
From the Xai Xai workshop, the most interesting obser-
vation is that in very few cases did the development 
challenges that people listed have much to do with 
climate change. The main exception was for agriculture. 
In the fishing livelihood group in Xai Xai, for example, 
there were challenges related to low fish catches, to the 
difficulty of selling what they had caught, and to the 
lack of a future for the children in these communities 
due to poor education. All of the 2050 vision points 
revolved around these issues. In the agroforestry group, 
the challenges for commercial actors related to poor 
infrastructure and access to credit, while for informal 
actors they related to poor forest management practices 
and ecosystem changes. In one case weather was listed 
as a challenge—the fact that charcoal producers need 
dry weather to work—but this is an issue more of insuf-
ficient ability to invest in building infrastructure for 
their operations. They were not saying that in 
Mozambique it rains too often, simply that rain pres-
ents a challenge.
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fIguRe 10. sTePs In RegIonal anD naTIonal woRkshoPs
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and socio-
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discussions
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Reflect on the
day
Note: The top figure shows the eight steps in each of the two regional workshops, while the figure on the bottom shows the seven steps taken in the national 
workshop.
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Again, the 2050 visions were consistent with reducing 
these challenges. In the trade and commerce group, 
again the challenges were related to poor infrastructure 
(such as roads, water, and electric grid), poor institutions 
and governance (such as lack of education, especially for 
girls; poor spatial planning; poorly developed markets; 
and inadequate access to credit), and generalized effects 
of poverty (such as a low standard of living, poor health, 
and high unemployment). This group did identify one 
climate-related challenge: the incidence of natural 
hazards. The visions for 2050 were again consistent 
with addressing these challenges, although it is note-
worthy that the vision did not contain anything about 
reducing exposure or sensitivity to natural hazards. Only 
in the agriculture and ranching group did climate 
factors play an important role as a barrier to develop-
ment. This group listed drought and floods as two of 
the three most important barriers. For this group, about 
half of the adaptations listed had something to do with 
reducing vulnerability to droughts and floods, while the 
rest related to issues of general poverty alleviation and 
greater access to markets.
beira key Insights
To test the effects of changing the workshop format, 
the project team divided participants into geographi-
cally identified groups. Each of the provinces identified 
a set of development targets, in terms of life expectancy, 
per capita income, fertility, population, education, and 
the size of the economically active workforce. They 
then listed the factors that would allow these targets to 
be realized, with similar ideas and suggestions across 
provinces. They then identified the potential climate 
impacts and the negative effects each could have in the 
province. There were some differences across provinces. 
First, Tete Province is in the driest part of 
Mozambique, where local communities have more 
limited livelihood strategies. Second, Nampula is a 
region normally hit by very strong hurricanes. Third, 
from Beira to Rovuma River, a long coastline of 
communities depend on fishing, using poor fishing 
methods, and thus are potentially more vulnerable to 
sea level rise and changes in storm intensity. Fourth, the 
central and northern regions have large forest areas, 
potentially susceptible to the combination of strong 
winds and drought, leading to highly damaging fires 
such as those that devastated Manica and Sofala in 
2008. Fifth, there is large-scale contract farming for 
cotton (for example, in Nampula) and tobacco (for 
example, Tete); this may mean that those communities 
engaged in such activities may have more income, and 
hence greater adaptive capacity. It may also mean that 
volatile price markets, especially for cotton, can weaken 
their capacity to cope.
However, no group focused on the specific relation-
ship between the factors leading to development 
targets and the climate impacts, and so it is hard to 
see whether they identified linkages or lack of link-
ages. Likewise, each of the groups listed adaptations 
fIguRe 11. MaPPIng of geogRaPhICal 
oRIgIn anD exPeRTIse
Note: These are the locations identified by participants in the xai xai work-
shop and show the effort to obtain stakeholders from a wide geographical 
range. breakout groups, however, followed sectoral expertise.
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appropriate for different climate impacts, and these 
options are consistent with those appearing in the 
NAPAs and the literature more generally, with near 
complete agreement across provinces as to the types of 
adaptations they see as important. What one can learn 
from these results, however, is that the adaptation 
needs that people identified were quite homogenous 
across the country. It was not the case that each prov-
ince needs its own unique ways of adaptation to each 
climate hazard.
In terms of workshop design, one conclusion to draw is 
that the geographic groupings may have been useful for 
developing discussions among a group of colleagues 
who could then later implement their collective ideas 
together (since they worked in the same province). 
However, it was a less successful strategy for eliciting 
detailed information about challenges associated with 
different livelihood activities, but to a large extent 
common across provinces. 
Maputo key Insights
The Maputo workshop devoted less time to identifying 
ways in which climate may affect particular sectors—
indeed suggestions, collated from the regional work-
shops, were handed to participants on note cards—and 
more attention to developing pathways of adaptation, 
something not done in the two regional workshops. 
Table 3 lists these pathways for each of the five break-
out groups.
These suggested pathways are similar to the results 
from Xai Xai, in that very few of the adaptation strate-
gies have much to do with climate change and much 
more to do with development in general. The major 
exception is for agriculture, both subsistence and 
commercial. This also finds its way into the longer term 
vision for the commercial sector, i.e., enhancing the 
sustainability of trade in agricultural products.
synthesis
Across the workshops, the more interesting results were 
in Xai Xai and Maputo, where participants focused their 
attention on particular economic and livelihood activi-
ties. Here, the common finding was that outside of agri-
culture, climate change does not present many clearly 
identifiable threats to the improvement in people’s liveli-
hoods. Attention within these sectors has to concentrate 
on improving existing management practices, from 
efforts to avoid overfishing and overharvesting of forests, 
to the continued development of a healthy commercial 
sector that can provide people with reliable sources of 
income. Within the agricultural sector, the threats from 
increased prevalence of both floods (in the fertile flood-
plains) and droughts (everywhere else) require a response 
that must take the form of both hard and soft measures.
Table 3. aDaPTaTIon PaThwaYs IDenTIfIeD In The MaPuTo woRkshoP
2009–2015 2015–2030 2030–2050
Forestry wildfire management and 
changes in standards
Alternative incoln! generating 
activities
Reforestation, forest management and 
(environmental) education particularly in forest 
concession areas (commercial forestry)
Trade Rehabilitation of rural 
commerce and trade networks; 
simplification of licensing 
procedures for small and 
medium enterprises
post-harvest processing; 
building silos; improved family/
community storage facilities
construction of infrastructure with can withstand 
climate disasters especially related to trade in 
agriculture
Fisheries improved fishing nets & 
improved fish management to 
promote sustainable use of 
resources
Building infrastructure for 
processing and conservation of 
to fish (increase yield and 
increase quality of product)
Education for skills development influence in 
behavior and attitude to enforce seasonal 
fishing restrictions; use improved fishing nets
subsistence 
agriculture 
conservation agriculture 
including planting crops 
resistant to drought
water harvesting techniques (ie. 
water storage tanh for 
consumption and irrigation)
Education so that people can learn to live with 
drought 
Commercial  
agriculture
construction of dykes for 
water retention (small scale)
construction of flood gates and 
dams in areas vulnerable
Reforestation so the areas destroyed by forest 
harvesting to floods and wildfires are reduced
26 t h E  s o c i A l  d i m E n s i o n s  o f  A d A p tAt i o n  t o  c l i m At E  c h A n g E  i n  m o z A m B i q U E
aDaPTaTIon oPTIons:  keY seCToRal 
TheMes 
In all three workshops, participants identified the same 
four basic activity sectors—agriculture, forestry, fishing, 
and commerce—as crucial for a consideration of adap-
tation pathways. In the Beira workshop these were all 
considered, even if discussion took place in geographi-
cally defined groups. Here are results from each of the 
four sectors, across the three workshops.
agriculture and Ranching
Table 4 presents the specific results from each of the 
three workshops.
Across the workshops, the theme emerged that the agri-
culture and ranching sectors would be the hardest hit by 
climate change. Potential increases in the likelihood and 
magnitude of drought, flooding, cyclones, and coastal 
flooding and intrusion would lead to reduced yields and 
greater insecurity. The adaptation options that people 
identified were a combination of infrastructure projects, 
the improved use of drought-resistant crops, and 
options that would allow people to diversify their 
incomes and self-insure. 
agroforestry
Across the workshops, deforestation emerged as a 
repeated problem. It was unclear in many people’s 
minds the extent to which this would be a direct conse-
quence of climate change, or simply of poor forest 
management practices, or of some combination of the 
two. Without resolving this question, almost all groups 
suggested approaches to improving forest management 
and forest access for commercial uses. Many of the 
participants suggested greater empowerment of local 
community groups, both in the design of management 
policies and in their enforcement, such as through 
community-based natural resource management.
fishing
People were worried about the direction that fisheries 
were heading, but there was very little consensus on the 
extent to which climate change was a driver of this 
problem, except for the fact that increases in cyclone 
strength could threaten fishing fleets in the absence of 
adequate early warning. In the Xai Xai workshop, 
participants suggested that the impact of climate change 
on fisheries would be indirect, by threatening agricul-
tural production and in turn leading to a greater reliance 
on fish as a food source and source of income.
Trade and Commerce
There was a concern that climate change could nega-
tively affect trade and commerce through several differ-
ent pathways. One pathway was in terms of losses in 
agricultural productivity; since agricultural commodities 
are the main thing traded, this would have a direct 
negative effect, both on supply of commodities from the 
rural areas into trade networks, and in terms of loss in 
purchasing power by rural people. Another pathway was 
in terms of a loss of infrastructure from extreme events, 
Table 4. woRkshoP ResulTs
Key impacts from 
climate change Consequences for development Adaptation options
xai xai droughts, floods, 
cyclones, and sea 
level rise
loss of production, loss of soil 
fertility and increased salinity, 
destruction of infrastructure, 
increased mortality
construction of water retention and flood protection 
infrastructure; construction of barns for animals, silos for grain 
storage, and food processing facilities to give greater market 
access.
Beira drought, flood, 
cyclone
malnutrition, loss of yields, loss of 
possessions in low-lying areas
drought-resistant crops, water conservation, income 
diversification through improved market access, resettlement
maputo drought, 
desertification, loss 
of soil fertility
Reduced crop yields, poverty, 
disease, malnutrition, food 
insecurity, loss of grazing land, loss 
of forest land
crop diversification, rainwater conservations, expanded 
irrigation, improved social services and health care, livelihood 
diversification, micro-finance for value added activities and 
market access
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Table 5. sPeCIfIC ResulTs anD suggesTIons fRoM The woRkshoPs
Key impacts from climate change Consequences for development Adaptation options
xai xai drought, flood, cyclone, and sea 
level rise
changes in forest ecosystems, 
destruction of forest access 
ways, loss of coastal vegetation
Reforestation, road construction, community 
resource conservation, early warning systems
Beira drought, flood, cyclone wildfires, deforestation community forest management, increased 
consumption of wild fruits, reforestation
maputo wildfires, loss of vegetation, loss 
of soil fertility
food insecurity, reduced forestry 
yields, destruction of housing
improved forest management including better 
enforcement of existing laws, community-based 
reforestation, improved control of wildfires, 
establishment of fire breaks, infrastructure to 
protect housing from fire
Table 6. keY fInDIngs In The fIshIng seCToR 
Key impacts from climate change Consequences for development Adaptation options
xai xai drought, flood, cyclones, and seal 
level rise
loss of agriculture leading to higher 
pressure on fisheries, reduction in 
catches, loss of fluvial fisheries
Adaptive agriculture, reforestation, early 
warning, introduction of new fish species, 
aquaculture.
Beira drought, flood, cyclone none identified moving artisanal fishing areas to those 
more suitable, community risk 
management, early warning
maputo changes in fish availability overexploitation and extinction of some 
species, reduced catches and attendant 
income, food insecurity
improvements to fishing nets, storage, 
and processing facilities; education and 
skill training; livelihood diversification 
away from fishing; improved early 
warning
Table 7. keY fInDIngs foR The TRaDe anD CoMMeRCe seCToRs
Key impacts from climate 
change Consequences for development Adaptation options
xai xai drought, flood, cyclones, and 
sea level rise
wild fires, loss of agricultural 
productivity, destruction of 
infrastructure, displacement of 
people, loss of land for economic 
development
Reforestation, adaptive agricultural practices, 
more resilient infrastructure, improved coastal 
erosion control
Beira drought, flood, cyclone loss of infrastructure Building stronger infrastructure, improving 
transportation, food processing and storage, 
and market places, improved social 
assistance, improved finance for small 
businesses
maputo Reduced and more variable 
agricultural production, loss of 
infrastructure, coastal flooding 
and erosion, cyclones
market price fluctuations and 
commodity scarcity, degradation of 
transportation networks
construction of grain and fish storage 
facilities, price monitoring, micro-insurance, 
improved roadways, flood protection barriers
28 t h E  s o c i A l  d i m E n s i o n s  o f  A d A p tAt i o n  t o  c l i m At E  c h A n g E  i n  m o z A m B i q U E
both buildings in town and roadways. In addition to 
addressing these causes directly, participants suggested 
that better access to credit and information would stim-
ulate a diversification and general development of the 
sector, thus making it more resilient.
IDenTIf ICaTIon of MosT VulneRable 
gRouPs
One of the important goals of the workshops was to 
identify the people and places that could be most 
vulnerable to the effects of climate change. The results, 
in general, were unsurprising as to both.
In terms of vulnerable places, these seemed simply to 
mirror where climate-relevant activities took place and 
the hazards were high. In the Xai Xai workshop, for 
example, the participants identified areas within the 
southern region of “most vulnerable” and “second most 
vulnerable” status, for each of the four livelihood activi-
ties. Figure 12 shows these identified areas, and in 
general they seemed to match up with the overlap of 
high hazard level and the particular activity. For agricul-
ture, it corresponded most closely to areas prone to 
drought but where people nevertheless farm. In the case 
of fishing, it appeared to be the result of thinking about 
where inland fishing is taking place and resources are 
under threat from overfishing. Coastal fishing also was 
seen as a hazardous activity, especially as artisanal fish-
ers increasingly go out farther from shore to find stocks. 
In the case of trade and commerce, it appeared that 
people were most likely to consider not the main cities, 
but rather smaller commercial centers that are marginal, 
and could be threatened in their existence by increasing 
rural poverty or decreasing crop yields.
In the Beira workshop, participants split into working 
groups according to provinces, and so there was not the 
opportunity to identify those places that were most 
vulnerable across the whole region. However, participants 
identified the vulnerable groups within their provinces. 
These included (a) fishermen vulnerable to hurricanes 
and possible sea level rise; (b) the farming communities 
using fire for land clearing and the communities near the 
forests, both of whom were considered vulnerable to wild 
and manmade fires as propagation may become easier 
during lengthy drought periods; and (c) pastoralists in 
Tete, where the ranching of small ruminants such as 
goats is a very important enterprise and the exacerbation 
of drought conditions has the potential to reduce pasture 
availability and worsen erosion.
In Maputo, participants again engaged in mapping—as 
in Xai Xai—with very similar results. Figure 13 shows 
the results for two sectors—fishing and forestry—and in 
both cases (as well as other sectors) the identified 
regions of high vulnerability were where risk levels are 
high and large numbers of employed people are 
employed. 
Across sectors at the Maputo workshop, the participants 
identified the following areas as most vulnerable:
• Coastal Nampula and southern Cabo Delgado, 
including the cities Nampula and Pemba. This 
would appear to be driven by fears of sea level rise 
and increases in cyclone strength and frequency.
fIguRe 12. VulneRable RegIons 
IDenTIfIeD In The xaI xaI woRkshoP
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• Northern Sofala and southern Zambezia. This 
would appear to be driven by fears about increased 
risk of f looding.
• Both inland and coastal areas of Gaza. This would 
appear to be driven by fears of increased risk of 
drought.
Participants also identified groups of people they 
considered to be the most vulnerable. All workshops 
considered this question and arrived at similar answers: 
Generally, the most vulnerable were those people with-
out the resources to withstand livelihood shocks, with-
out the capacity to adapt, and without social support 
networks. Specifically, they included (a) children, in 
particular orphans; (b) women, in particular women 
who head households; (c) the elderly; and (d) those 
with physical or mental handicaps. 
In all workshops, participants suggested that members 
of each of the above groups were most vulnerable when 
engaged in dry-land farming as their main livelihood 
activity. They suggested that existing social support 
mechanisms, such as social security offered by the 
government, are inadequate to ensure the members of 
these groups with adequate livelihood security.
RelaTIVe PReValenCe of “haRD” 
VeRsus “sofT”  aDaPTaTIon oPTIons
One workshop result that stood out was that people 
saw both hard and soft adaptation options as impor-
tant. Within each category, people also saw a mix of 
options that would be centrally planned and delivered 
by the government or NGO community, and those that 
would be operationalized at the household or 
fIguRe 13. RegIons IDenTIfIeD as MosT VulneRable In The MaPuTo woRkshoP
   
Note: The left-hand picture shows results for the fisheries sector, while the right-hand figure shows results for the forestry sector.
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community level. Another axis where adaptation 
options differed was in terms of whether they directly 
addressed a particular climate risk, or would primarily 
act by increasing adaptive capacity. In the following 
table, the latter appear in italics.
One interesting result was that when participants had to 
identify which options would directly benefit the most 
vulnerable communities, they were much more likely to 
identify soft centralized options, and in particular those 
that addressed underlying problems of adaptive capacity. 
These included better credit, better information, and 
improved health care and social services and support. 
This is unsurprising, since what separates the most 
vulnerable from the others is their lack of access to 
these things. Specifically, the Maputo workshops listed 
the following adaptation options as most directly bene-
fiting the most vulnerable:
• Improved rural trade, with fewer barriers to entry, 
and technical assistance programs for vulnerable 
groups
• Improved agriculture practices, including more use 
of wild resources such as fruits, apiculture, and non-
timber forest products, and better mapping of agro-
ecological zones
• Education for capacity improvement, combined 
with better micro-credit.
Participants at the workshops covered a wide range of 
experience, both in terms of the level of activity in 
which they were engaged, and the sector in which their 
experience lay. The workshops did not record results at 
the individual level, however, and all group work 
contained stakeholders with a variety of backgrounds. 
Hence, it is not possible to identify whether there were 
significant differences in views as to adaptation options 
across different classes or groups of stakeholders.
CongRuenCe wITh naTIonal Plans, 
InCluDIng naPas
One intention of the PSD workshops was to find out 
whether an approach to adaptation planning that explic-
itly considered (a) the needs of most vulnerable commu-
nities, and (b) the potential for climate impacts 
interfering with development visions, would differ 
substantially from previous adaptation planning exercises, 
such as the NAPA. The main conclusion that one can 
reach is that there are very few differences in outcomes 
between the NAPA process and the PSD process.
The NAPAs identified four priority areas for national 
planning and policy development. These were:
• Strengthening the early warning system for floods, 
droughts, and tropical cyclones. This would benefit the 
safety of people engaged in all areas of economic 
activity threatened by disasters. It would also have 
significant economic implications for the agricul-
tural sector—the activities of which are directly 
affected by f looding and droughts—and the 
Table 8. keY aDaPTaTIon oPTIons fRoM PsD woRkshoPs
Centralized Distributed
hard • flood control dikes and levies
• coastal flood control gates
• dams and irrigation channels
• Improved roadways
• Improved communication infrastructure
• farm-scale water storage facilities 
• more robust buildings
• Grain storage facilities
• Improved food processing equipment
soft • improved early warning of hazards
• Better planning and management of forest, fish, and other 
natural resources
• Resettlement of populations to lower risk zones
• More credit and financial services for small businesses and 
rural development
• Better education and information for the rural areas
• Improved health care, social services, and social support 
for the poor
• Better utilization of drought-resistant crops
• Use of highland areas for living and lowland areas for 
farming
• Better household and community management and use of 
natural resources
• practice of soil conservation agriculture
• Diversification of livelihoods away from agriculture
• Better planning of how much grain to save for personal 
consumption, and how much to sell for income generation
Note: The items appearing in plain text directly respond to anticipated climate hazards, while those in italics respond to the need for improved adaptive capacity.
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fisheries sector, given the exposure of its infrastruc-
ture to tropical cyclones and the need to bring fish-
ing f leets into safety.
• Strengthening the capacities of agricultural producers to 
cope with climate change. This attention to capacity 
includes both hard and soft adaptation measures, 
and also addressed the general state of development. 
Putting in place f lood control and irrigation infra-
structure would clearly improve people’s capacities. 
So would improving their knowledge about how to 
use early warning systems to mitigate losses from 
floods and droughts. Improving capacities could 
also, however, mean developing other income-gen-
erating activities for people now engaged solely in 
agriculture, as these would better enable people to 
withstand climatic hazards.
• Reduction of climate change impacts in coastal zones. 
This would likely involve a great deal of infrastruc-
ture to protect urban areas and transportation 
routes, and thus would have the greatest impact, 
from a social perspective, on commerce and indus-
try. It would also involve a wider range of measures 
beneficial to both fishing and coastal agricultural 
communities.
• Management of water resources under climate change. 
This would likely have the largest impact on the 
agricultural sector, which relies on a continuous 
supply of rainfall or irrigation during the growing 
season and is most vulnerable to f looding. It would 
also have an impact on energy production, and thus 
indirectly on commerce, as well as on public health 
through improved sanitation.
Other national plans have contained similar or identical 
priorities for adaptation and development. The congru-
ence between these plans and the results of the PSD 
workshops can be seen in two respects:
• The PSD process independently identified all of the 
adaptation priorities previously noted in the 
NAPAs. First, the PSD workshops identified that, 
among sectors, agriculture is the most vulnerable, 
both because of its high climate exposure and 
because of the social vulnerability of the people 
practicing it. Second, within the agricultural sector, 
it identified that a range of measures is required, 
from those that address climate impacts such as 
f looding and drought directly with new 
infrastructure and knowledge, to those that allow 
farmers to broaden their livelihoods by engaging in 
commercial activities. Third, the workshops did 
identify the threats to infrastructure in the coastal 
zone, including roads, fishing boats, and buildings. 
Fourth, the PSD workshops identified early warn-
ing system improvements as a key cross-cutting 
adaptation. Fifth, the workshops identified the bet-
ter management of water, such as through the prac-
tice of conservation agriculture, as an important 
adaptation option.
• The PSD workshops identified the options previ-
ously noted in the NAPAs as the most important 
elements of adaptation pathways that directly 
addressed climate concerns. In the Beira workshop, 
participants focused most closely on the different 
climate impacts and how to adapt to each of them. 
All of the options they identified as most important 
match one of the NAPA priority areas.
In one respect, however, the PSD workshops—especially 
the one in Xai Xai—reached an implicit conclusion 
different from that of the NAPA process. The conclu-
sion was that, except within agriculture, development 
goals in general were not threatened very much by 
climate change, and that far more important are those 
development initiatives that make sense independent of 
climate change. This conclusion can be reached when 
starting by considering development visions within 
different economic sectors, moving on to considering the 
threats to those visions, and finally considering how 
climate change may contribute to these threats. In the 
NAPA process, by contrast, the question was somewhat 
different: what can be done to adapt to those climate 
impacts that could pose a threat to development. This is 
the same question that guided the Maputo PSD work-
shop. When considering this question, the Maputo PSD 
came up with answers similar to the NAPA process. 
PolICY PReConDITIons anD 
InsTITuTIonal base
In all workshops, some of the most important adapta-
tion options represented improvements in existing 
government programs and practices. For example, many 
participants suggested that the forestry sector did not 
necessarily need new laws to promote more sustainable 
forest management, but rather more effective and fair 
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enforcement of existing laws. Statements such as these 
thus suggest a necessary improvement in the ability of 
the government to act effectively—what many might 
consider a precondition.
The Maputo workshop was the only one to address 
directly the issue of preconditions. Participants identi-
fied the following list of options:
• Improving the competence of government
• Combating corruption
• Improving vocational training
• Creating a more attractive policy for investment in 
Mozambique
• Mainstreaming climate issues into sectoral policies.
Does this list make sense? Certainly, having a competent 
government free of corruption does make sense and is 
consistent with the messages from the other two work-
shops. Vocational training and improving the investment 
climate are also, perhaps, the two most important ways 
of improving adaptive capacity. Whether one considers 
improvement in adaptive capacity to be an adaptation in 
its own right, or a precondition for adaptation, is a 
subject of much lively academic debate. These partici-
pants, at least, though the latter. The final item on the 
list, mainstreaming, simply represents a particular 
approach to adaptation governance. Many would see this 
as the best way to begin to address climate concerns 
across a wide range of sectors, where climate is not the 
main problem on policy-makers’ list of concerns.
ConClusIons fRoM The woRkshoP 
TRaCk 
 The workshop track was an extremely useful means of 
generating intense discussion on the issues of climate 
change vulnerability and adaptation in Mozambique, 
paying particular attention to the issues facing the most 
vulnerable in society while taking a development-first 
perspective. The main result from the workshops is to 
validate previous findings. These are:
• The most vulnerable in society are people lacking 
the capacity to cope with climate shocks or adapt to 
changes, and without strong social and family sup-
port networks. These include orphans, female-
headed households, the elderly, and people with 
physical or mental handicaps.
• Adaptation options need to address both the spe-
cific risks associated with climate change—
droughts, f loods, and cyclones—with a portfolio of 
hard and soft options, as well as with the underly-
ing capacity of people to adapt and their resilience 
in the face of extreme events.
• In the case of the most vulnerable people, their 
most urgent need is for assistance that will improve 
their resilience and adaptive capacity, such as educa-
tion, social support, and programs that allow them 
to diversify their livelihood strategies.
• Agriculture is the area of economic activity in 
which the future development is most threatened by 
climate change impacts. It is essential both to 
develop specific infrastructure and soft adaptations 
to protect agricultural producers from extreme 
weather and climate events, and to enable them to 
diversify their activities into other income-generat-
ing activities.
None of these findings contradicts the main findings 
either of past adaptation assessment or planning exer-
cises, such as the NAPA, or the findings of the 
Mozambique sectoral findings in the EACC study.
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6. fIelDwoRk ResulTs 
The primary purpose of the fieldwork in Mozambique 
was to validate the results from the PSD workshops, in 
two respects. First, we were interested in the question of 
differential vulnerability: who were the most vulnerable 
and what were the effects of climate change on them 
relative to everyone else. Second, we were interested in 
the coping and adaptation options identified. Would 
there be regional variation in the options identified?
To address these tasks, the team gathered data using 
three methods. The first was a set of institutional inter-
views: speaking with particularly knowledgeable people 
in the community, or people with decision-making 
responsibility. The second was a set of focus-group 
discussions: speaking with groups of people representing 
communities covering a range of vulnerability. The third 
was a household survey: interviewing households in 
each community, again representing a range of vulnera-
bility profiles, to find out their individual perspectives. 
The three activities took place in each of the districts 
where fieldwork was conducted, as shown in Figure 9. 
In some districts, however, there was not the opportu-
nity to conduct institutional interviews.
ResulTs fRoM InsTITuTIonal 
InTeRVIews
All of the institutional interviews followed a common 
format. The steps in this format were:
• Describe the participants in the interview session. 
There were usually several participants from the 
local government and NGOs operating in the 
district.
• Identify the main climate risks in the district. 
These included droughts, f loods, cyclones, and in 
some cases wildfires and coastal erosion. 
Participants identified past events that had been 
particularly severe.
• Describe the overall sensitivity of the community to 
these risks, identifying the groups within the com-
munity most vulnerable to these risks.
• Identify options to mitigate and adapt to these 
risks. The participants went through the list of risks 
in their district, and suggested adaptation options 
for each. They divided these into institutional 
options (what their own organization could do) and 
options for the community (what the community as 
a whole could benefit from).
• Identify the main constraints preventing the imple-
mentation of these options. In this case, every inter-
view identified financial constraints as the single 
most important factor. Most also identified the lack 
of knowledge, information, and skills as an addi-
tional constraint.
Overall, the results from each of these interviews were 
not surprising. The hazards and risks that people identi-
fied were in all cases consistent with the results from 
risk mapping, using national-level data. People were 
thus well-informed about the risks faced by their 
community. In general, the results from the other ques-
tions were also consistent across interviews, with people 
listing exactly those adaptation options for each of the 
risks that had been identified in the PSD workshops. 
Beyond this, there were several other interesting find-
ings from the interviews. Table 9 lists each of them, 
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noting the people identified as most vulnerable, and 
interesting lessons—with respect to risks, sensitivity, or 
adaptation options—that stood out from their other 
answers.
It is clear that the people identified as most vulnerable 
are the same, by and large, as those identified in the 
PSD workshops. Unfortunately, the institutional inter-
views did not shed any particular light on the nature of 
vulnerability among these groups. 
ResulTs fRoM foCus gRouP 
DIsCussIons
The focus group discussions had the same intention: to 
identify particularly vulnerable social groups, and to 
brainstorm about potential adaptation options. Unlike 
the institutional interviews, they were held not with key 
decision makers in each community, but rather with 
people representing a particular social group with 
medium to high vulnerability. The format that they 
followed was:
• Social and demographic characteristics of the group. 
Discussions started with those in attendance, and 
then moved to the members of the same social 
group in the wider community.
• Social differentiation. Participants described the role 
of the group in the overall structure of the 
community.
• Natural disasters. Discussion then moved on to the 
major disasters in the region. People described the 
disasters, when they had occurred with what conse-
quences, and why they believed they happened.
• Climate hazards and vulnerability. Discussion moved 
from natural disasters in general to focus on climate 
Table 9. InTeResTIng lessons fRoM The foCus gRouP InTeRVIews
Location Participants Especially vulnerable Interesting lessons
Angoche 1 ngo and 
government
subsistence farmers, single 
mothers, children, elderly
• hazards result from witchcraft
• need to protect forest areas and trees to protect against drought and 
storm surges
• need to avoid living right at the coast
chibabava 5 ngos none listed • need to build water storage dams
chokwe 3 ngos Elderly, children, widows, 
pregnant
• should live on high ground for floods, farm on low ground for droughts
• stay away from the dams, where flooding is more common
• stock surpluses to prepare for drought, sell them in times of drought
gondola government not listed • there is no disaster planning
inhambane government orphans, elderly, physically 
handicapped, chronically 
sick
• trying to resettle people on higher ground
• need better infrastructure
• need better access roads
mabote 4 ngos, 
government
Elderly, widows, children, 
pregnant women
• need to conserve soil better
manhiça six ngos Elderly and orphans • need more early warning, more diversification of income
• people attribute disasters to ancestors
massingir 4 ngos Elderly, children, 
handicapped, single 
women, widows
• need to stock surpluses and sell them
• floods happen when dam sluice gates open, and can be forecast
• need to diversify income
• need to build irrigation systems
matutuine government not listed • need dikes and small dams, and more information
moatize government not listed • need better information
mopeia 2 ngos not listed • Early warning
• Better organization of farmers, for risk management committees and 
to distribute surpluses more effectively
xai xai 2 ngos none listed • need to store surpluses
• Build irrigation systems
• stronger houses to protect against cyclones
zavala 5 ngos widows, single mothers, 
elderly, handicapped
• farm low-lying areas, live on high ground
• need to build more solid houses because of cyclones
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hazards and vulnerability. People described the fac-
tors that made them more or less vulnerable, and 
the reasons why these factors mattered.
• Adaptive and coping capacities. Participants described 
the steps that people have taken to adapt to and 
cope with climate hazards, and the factors that have 
helped or hindered them from doing so. In this sec-
tion, participants identified some of the institutions 
that have played a key role.
• Long-term adaptation. From the discussion on adap-
tive and coping capacity, participants then moved to 
discuss possible long-term adaptations. What are 
they? Who could implement them?
• Barriers to implementation. Participants described 
the factors that could stand in the way of imple-
menting the long-term adaptations they had 
described.
Table 10 presents results from across all focus groups. It 
considers six themes, omitting only the characteristics of 
the particular groups. It presents answers to three ques-
tions. First, what were the most common answers and 
issues identified across all focus group discussions? 
Second, to what extent did these answers vary according 
to geographical factors, such as exposure to particular 
hazards? Third, to what extent did these answers vary 
according to different stakeholder groups; that is, did the 
farmers give the same answers as the fishers and the 
charcoal collectors?
These results are completely in line with those from 
the PSD workshops, which in turn were in line with 
past studies and assessment. The important finding, 
however, is the general lack of variance in responses, 
either geographically or across social groups. Also, the 
respondents were quite clear that the most vulnerable 
were that way because they lacked the capacity to work.
To supplement the results in Table 10, Annex 1 presents 
noteworthy comments and observations made in each 
of the groups. These begin to paint a picture of people’s 
stories of vulnerability.
ResulTs fRoM householD suRVeYs
The final set of data collected during the fieldwork was 
in the form of the household surveys. The three 
enumerators interviewed 136 households across all of 
the districts where fieldwork was conducted. In each 
district, the intention was to interview households 
Table 10. aggRegaTe ResulTs fRoM foCus gRouP DIsCussIons
Most common responses Geographic heterogeneity Social heterogeneity
Social 
differentiation
in most communities subsistence farmers 
were listed as the major social group, with 
livelihood diversification into forestry and 
fishing
diversification of strategies 
depended on location, and 
whether suitable for fishing or 
forestry
none
Natural disasters droughts were the main concern, followed 
by floods and cyclones
participants listed hazards 
according to their exposure, 
consistent with risk maps
none
Climate hazards 
and vulnerability
children, female-headed households, the 
elderly, and handicapped people are the 
most vulnerable, because of their limited 
ability to work
none none
Adaptive and 
coping capacities
in most cases people try to cope and adapt, 
but have very little assistance and support
in some regions there are social 
support networks, such as 
farming or fishing cooperatives; 
these provide help
fishermen seemed most in 
need of cyclone early 
warning; farmers in flood 
plains needed warning of 
upstream dam releases 
Long-term 
adaptation
people listed the same set of adaptation 
options identified in psd workshops
Areas heavily reliant on fishing 
and forestry were more likely to 
list better natural resource 
management
subsistence farmers were 
most likely to mention income 
diversification
Barriers to 
implementation
All groups listed the inadequacy of finance 
and technical support
none none
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representing the range of anticipated vulnerability. In 
this section, we first present the important raw data in 
graphical form. We then go on to analyze important 
relationships. Annex 2 contains a copy of the survey 
instrument. 
household size, Resource access, and self-
sufficiency
The first way of describing the data is in terms of 
household size and the access to resources. Figure 14 
shows the distribution of household sizes. The largest 
households had fifteen members, while the majority of 
households were between four and seven people, with 
seven being the most frequent household size.
The next data are the household’s access to farmland, 
and the sufficiency of the farmland to meet the house-
hold’s needs. Figure 15 shows the distribution of field 
sizes in highland and lowland areas. Field sizes tend to 
be somewhat smaller in lowland areas, where close to 50 
percent of respondents had less than 1 ha of land to 
farm. In highland areas, the majority of people had 
between 1 ha and 5 ha of land to farm. Figure 16 shows 
the pattern of people bringing their harvest to market. 
Almost all respondents kept at least 40 percent of their 
harvest for household consumption. A quarter of 
respondents took 20 percent or less of their harvest to 
market. Finally, Figure 17 shows how long the harvests 
kept for the household typically would last. The 
majority of households reported the stocks lasting 
between three and six months. Only about 10 percent 
reported their stocks lasting throughout the entire year. 
The picture that emerges is of households that have 
many mouths to feed, and in general do not grow 
enough grain on their own to do so. Most households 
keep the majority of their harvest for their own 
consumption, and yet in only a few cases does that 
harvest last the entire year. 
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experience with Climate hazards
The next data pertain to the climate hazards that 
people face. As Figure 18 shows, almost all respondents 
reported being negatively affected by one or more 
climate hazards. About half of them had received prior 
warnings about these, while half of them were caught 
relatively unaware. Figure 19 suggests which hazards 
they view as the most severe for them. Over three-
quarters of respondents listed droughts as the most 
important climate-related hazard they face, with 
smaller numbers listing floods and cyclones as the most 
severe. Half of the respondents list floods as either the 
most or second-most important hazard they face. A 
large number list fire and erosion—indirect climate 
impacts—as the third most important threat they face. 
These results are consistent with what was learned 
during the PSD workshops, and indeed is common 
wisdom about Mozambique’s vulnerability to climate 
change.
Respondents listed the ways they had been affected by 
these hazards, and in an open-ended question listed the 
effects they were most concerned about. These were:
• Destruction and loss of property (56 respondents)
• Hunger and lack of food (20 respondents)
• Low agricultural production (15 respondents)
• Degraded condition of the fields (10 respondents)
• Lack of water in the wells (eight respondents)
• Lack of rain (seven respondents)
• Being left exposed to the elements (six respondents)
• Panic and suffering (five respondents)
• Death and physical damage (four respondents)
• Forced relocation (one respondent)
• Limited fishing activity (one respondent)
The next question on the survey asked respondents 
whether there was variation in the effects that different 
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households in the community had suffered as a result of 
climate hazards; 80 percent responded that there is vari-
ation. When asked to identify the factors influencing 
such differences, their answers were:
• House construction, i.e., traditional versus conven-
tional materials (44 respondents)
• Income level of household (28 respondents)
• Being a member of an especially vulnerable group, 
e.g., elderly, children, female- headed households, 
handicapped (11 respondents)
• Diversification into other economic activities (nine 
respondents)
• Geographic factors, such as location of farm on 
highlands or lowlands (two respondents)
Respondents then were asked if their own household 
had suffered differently from most other households in 
the community from climate hazards. Again, 80 percent 
of the respondents said yes, they had suffered differently 
from other households in the community. In this case, 
the reasons most commonly listed were:
• Their own income level, compared to that of the 
community (34 respondents)
• Their prevention efforts against climate hazards (23 
respondents)
• Their income diversification (eight respondents)
• The quality of their roof (eight respondents)
• Being a member of a vulnerable group (five 
respondents)
What can we learn from examining these two sets of 
answers? The first is that two sets of factors are the 
most important determinants of vulnerability: people’s 
level and diversity of income, and the extent to which 
they have prepared themselves for extreme weather, 
such as through the quality of their houses. When view-
ing the matter in the abstract, people were more likely 
to list preparations as more important. When thinking 
about it in terms of their own personal experiences, they 
were more likely to list income as the most important 
factor. This could reflect an unwillingness to take 
personal responsibility for having suffered more than 
other households because of the failure to take precau-
tionary measures. In terms of whom they have gone to 
for assistance after climate hazards, 39 percent of 
respondents indicated that they turned to the local 
government authorities, 32 percent to the traditional 
leaders and authorities, and 29 percent to other organi-
zations, including INGC and NGOs.
Past adaptation and Coping Practices
The heart of the survey investigated households’ adapta-
tion coping practices. Two open-ended questions asked 
respondents to list their primary coping strategies for a 
range of climatic hazards. Figure 20 shows the results, 
in terms of the strategies identified most frequently to 
prepare for hazards and to cope with hazards during 
and after their occurrence.
To prepare for drought, about a quarter of the people 
did not identify any coping strategy they had imple-
mented in advance. Since almost all respondents listed 
drought as a major concern, this could simply indicate 
that they did not see options available. Among strategies, 
the most common were planting crops in the wetter 
(and sometimes irrigated) lowlands, planting shorter-
season (i.e., more drought tolerant) crop varieties, and 
improving their buildings. The point about improving 
their buildings does not make obvious sense, but could 
include the construction of granaries in order to store 
more surplus harvest. An additional ten different strate-
gies were mentioned, but in each case by only one or 
two respondents: these constitute “other.” These included 
preparing for fires, hunting rats, engaging in more weed-
ing, and engaging in religious practices. During and after 
droughts, the three most common strategies were to 
plant any new crops in the wetter lowlands, to manage 
forest resources carefully in order to obtain income from 
those forests as a safety net, and to manage past surplus 
harvests and cash receipts carefully. The majority of 
respondents, however, suggested that they did nothing. 
The “other” strategies again included a wide variety of 
measures, including spending more time in the shade. 
A larger fraction of respondents do not prepare for 
floods, likely because many of them do not face a flood 
risk in their district. Of those who do prepare, the most 
common preparations were to plant in the highlands, to 
fortify their houses, and to plant short-season varieties. 
Why short-season varieties? On the one hand, these 
would be more appropriate for highland farming. On the 
other hand, in the floodplain these would be more likely 
to be harvested before the flood hits. During and after a 
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flood, most people listed nothing that they can do. The 
only common strategy listed was to plant in the high-
lands, while a number of other strategies enlisted the 
support of only one or two respondents. These included 
building canoes and keeping belongings in safe places.
The pattern of preparation for cyclones was very similar 
to that for floods, albeit with fewer additional strategies 
covered by the “other” category, and more people listing 
the planting of shorter season crop varieties, in order to 
improve the chances of gathering a rainy season harvest 
before the cyclone hits. Over three quarters of respon-
dents listed nothing to do during and immediately after 
a cyclone. The three most frequently listed strategies 
were to plant short-season crops in the highlands, and to 
gather wild fruits to make up for the lack of a harvest.
One important question is whether the propensity, or 
ability, to carry out these adaptation and coping strate-
gies correlates with income or other resources. The final 
section of the survey asked participants to list whether a 
member of their household worked either for payment 
in cash or in kind (61 percent of respondents answered 
“yes”) and whether the household had any monetary 
savings to pay for special emergencies (55 percent 
answered “yes”). We examined whether the answers to 
either of these two questions significantly correlated 
with the six sets of results presented in Figure 20. Using 
a X2 test, we found no significant correlations (p > 0.10 
in all cases). In all cases, similar proportions of those 
with and without employment income, or with and 
without savings, engaged in adaptations, and the adap-
tations in which they engaged were similar.
We repeated this analysis using not income or the pres-
ence of cash reserves as an indicator of income or 
resources, but rather other factors. First, we looked at 
the productivity of the farm. Figure 17 indicated the 
number of months that households’ harvests lasted; we 
assumed that those households where the harvest lasted 
less than four months had low productivity, those where 
the harvest lasted between five and eight months 
medium productivity, and those lasting nine or more 
months high productivity. Again, using a X2 test, we 
found no significant correlations between this and the 
adaptation strategies that households reported making 
(p > 0.10 in all cases). Second we looked at the educa-
tion level of the household head, coding them as being 
without schooling, having completed only some primary 
school, and having completed all of primary school or 
more. Again, there were no significant correlations. 
Third, we repeated the test based on household size as a 
measure of income: perhaps larger households would 
have more hands available to engage in the adaptations. 
In this case, we did find one marginally significant rela-
tionship (p = 0.09), namely between household size and 
flood preparations. Households with more than seven 
members were twice as likely as smaller ones to engage 
in some sort of adaptation; at the same time, there was a 
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difference in the favored adaptation strategies, among 
those who did adapt. Larger households were much less 
likely to move their farming operations to the high-
lands, and much more likely to engage in all of the 
other adaptation strategies listed. Presumably, it is hard 
to move a very big household. All other relationships 
were insignificant (p > 0.10 in all cases). 
Planned adaptation and strategies
The survey asked people what, if anything, they would 
do if the climate hazards in their regions were to 
become significantly more severe. The most common 
answers were:
• Nothing (70 respondents)
• Move to a safer or more productive area (23 
respondents)
• Seek help from others (nine respondents)
• Raise and sell animals (seven respondents)
• Improve the durability of the house (six 
respondents)
• Practice drought-resistant cultivation (five 
respondents)
Other ideas, given by three or fewer respondents each, 
included seeking employment, hunting, and eating less. 
These results suggest that most respondents do not have 
a clear picture of what they would do to adapt to 
climate change, and of those who do, the most 
frequently listed option was migration. 
When asked whether they felt that their household was 
more or less able to engage in longer-term adaptations, 
compared to other households in the community, 48 
percent thought they were more able, 27 percent thought 
they were equally able, and 25 percent thought they were 
less able. This result—only 25 percent thinking they are 
less able than average to adapt—is broadly consistent 
with findings of overconfidence in the psychological liter-
ature, such as the fact that 90 percent of people think that 
they are above-average drivers. There was no significant 
correlation between the belief of being more or less able 
to adapt to climate change with any of the previously 
considered indicators of adaptive capacity: household size, 
number of months the harvest would last, education of 
the household head, paid employment, or cash savings for 
emergencies (p > 0.10 in all cases, X2 test).
who should help? 
Respondents gave their opinion on which organiza-
tions currently play the more important role in helping 
to mitigate natural disasters. Forty-six percent of 
respondents suggested that it was agencies of the 
national government, such as INGC or INAS, while 
31 percent thought it was local government or tradi-
tional authorities, and 23 percent thought that it was 
an NGO, such as the Red Cross or World Vision. 
These organizations are providing assistance such as 
direct support (food, clothes, money), early warning, 
and education. What do people need more of from 
these organizations? The most common response 
(from 39 percent of respondents) was more direct 
support, followed by early warning (13 percent of 
respondents), awareness-raising (7 percent), and 
improved provision of basic services, such as schools, 
roads, and hospitals (5 percent).
synthesis of quantitative findings from household 
survey
 The household survey offered results in most ways 
broadly consistent with the results from the PSD 
workshops, and from the institutional interviews and 
focus group discussions. People in general were worried 
about the same climate-related hazards, viewing 
droughts, floods, and cyclones as the most severe 
threats to their livelihoods, in that order. They were 
engaging in a variety of coping mechanisms, the same 
coping mechanisms identified earlier: cultivating 
shorter season varieties of crops, switching their culti-
vation between highlands and lowlands depending on 
the relative threat of flooding and drought, reinforcing 
their buildings, and managing their other resources 
more wisely. Very few, interestingly, listed working 
more for money as a strategy they were engaging in, 
perhaps because there are so few such jobs. In all cases, 
there seemed to be more options available to more 
people to prepare for a hazard ahead of time, rather 
than during or after. This would suggest the need for 
improved early warning, something identified in the 
PSD workshop as important, and by the survey 
respondents as something they would like more of. Of 
course what they really need and want is money, food, 
and clothing; this is consistent with a lack of resources 
being the greatest obstacle to coping and adaptation.
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What the survey did not show was a significant relation-
ship between the hypothesized—and in the literature, 
previously identified—determinants of adaptive capacity, 
and people’s propensity to have engaged in adaptation or 
coping options, or their perceived ability to engage in 
such options in the future. Only one relationship was 
marginally significant, between household size and 
coping measures, with larger households showing a 
different pattern than smaller ones. But given 35 rela-
tionships investigated, chance alone could account for 
one of these appearing to be significant at the 10 percent 
confidence level. It is certainly not a strong finding. The 
lack of significance could be because the sample size was 
too small, because the survey was not ideally designed or 
poorly administered, or simply because differences in the 
determinants of adaptive capacity within the communi-
ties surveyed simply do not matter very much.
Finally, the survey paints a fairly bleak picture of future 
adaptation at the household level. The majority of 
households do not have any idea of how they would 
adapt to more severe climate hazards, and one of the 
most common strategies identified by those who did 
have an idea—asking others in the community for 
help—would probably not work very well given that 
everyone in the community would be suffering. The 
most common strategy identified was migration. This is 
consistent with the literature on adaptation, and yet it is 
a highly disruptive act for any household.
sYnThesIs of f IelDwoRk ResulTs
Put together, the three sets of data from the fieldwork 
validate the results from the PSD workshops, which 
was their primary intention. There were a few addi-
tional new findings:
• The institutional interviews and focus group discus-
sions both revealed very little regional heterogene-
ity, and the focus group discussions revealed very 
little heterogeneity according to social group.
• The household surveys revealed no significant dif-
ferential vulnerability, on the basis of commonly 
used indicators, such as household assets, education, 
or income.
• The household surveys revealed a very low aware-
ness on the part of most people of how they would 
adapt to future climate change, should that bring 
with it an increase in the frequency or severity of 
natural hazards.
The last of these points is consistent with an important 
conclusion from the PSD workshops, namely that there 
is an urgent need for awareness raising and education 
about climate change, and options for adapting to 
climate change, among subsistence farmers.
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7. sYnThesIs anD DIsCussIon 
This section consists of three steps. First, we discuss the 
main adaptation options gleaned from this research, 
comparing them with options that were suggested 
before, such as in the NAPAs. In so doing, we address 
the first question: Does a development-first assessment 
process result in different findings from a more tradi-
tional impacts approach? We also compare these 
conclusions with the general conclusions from the 
economic track of the EACC study. Second, we look at 
the issue of differential vulnerability. Who are the most 
vulnerable, why, and what interventions can best assist 
them? Third, we evaluate some of the weaknesses and 
limitations in this study, and the extent to which our 
results on either of the first two questions may be sensi-
tive to these weaknesses. Finally, we offer policy 
recommendations.
aDaPTaTIon oPTIons
The PSD workshops generated a list of adaptation 
options, described in Table 8. The fieldwork generated 
new results that in most cases left this list of options 
intact, but in some cases changed them. Table 11 pres-
ents the revised list. 
As with Table 8, the options in plain text respond 
directly to climate hazards, while those in italics repre-
sent measures to increase the adaptive capacity of the 
population, or to make them more resilient to shocks to 
their livelihoods in general. Changes from Table 8 to 
Table 11 include the addition of wells for drinking 
water, the construction of hospitals and schools, better 
sensitivity to how farmers can hedge their risks by farm-
ing both highland and lowland fields, and the impor-
tance of wild fruits as a natural resource in times of 
stress.
All of the options in the left-hand column, being 
centralized, represent potential government interven-
tions. The right-hand column, by contrast, represents 
measures that people can undertake on their own. The 
literature on adaptation often characterizes such actions 
as “autonomous” (Patt et al. in press and Aaheim et al. 
2007), as if they took place on their own without any 
particular agency. This may be a misnomer in a country 
like Mozambique. First, there is a great deal of inten-
tionality behind any of these actions. Second, and more 
importantly, many of these represent actions that 
people do not have the resources or skills to undertake 
on their own. This is particularly the case with the hard 
options: they take money. The people who have the 
money have already undertaken them, in particular 
making their buildings more robust. But any of the soft 
options are also difficult without the right economic 
enabling environment. Many, for example, would like to 
diversify their incomes, but there are simply no oppor-
tunities to do so. Direct government intervention, in 
the form of rural economic development, may be 
necessary.
None of these options are inconsistent with the NAPAs 
and previous planning efforts. What they do accom-
plish, however, is to suggest a number of specific ways 
of improving the capacities of farmers to cope with 
increasingly adverse weather. They also highlight the 
fact that some of the most important adaptation options 
are in fact those that commonly would be labeled 
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development, such as improved finance in rural areas 
and the provision of social services.
They are also consistent with the economic track results 
of the EACC study. That part made several recommen-
dations for adaptation strategies:
• Development. The main result of the economic 
study was that the most important means of over-
coming the challenge of climate change was 
through the development of human capital (for 
example, education) and the growth of well-func-
tioning institutions. 
• Regional river basin management. Mozambique is a 
downstream country, and it needs to cooperate 
more closely with upstream countries to ensure the 
best use of runoff.
• Agriculture research and extension. Mozambique’s 
crop yields are due to decline given a continuation 
of current practices, but could increase significantly 
with better utilization of existing technologies, 
based on an evaluation of suitability.
• Rural roads. Roads are necessary for rural develop-
ment, and unpaved roads will be washed out more 
frequently by the expected increase in extreme pre-
cipitation events.
• Zoning and land-use planning. Given the economic 
growth that is projected for Mozambique, it is 
important to plan carefully so that the growth 
occurs in low-risk areas.
• Careful, and limited, use of hard adaptation options. 
Hard adaptation options are an enticing way of pro-
tecting against extreme events. The study found 
that often the costs of these options far exceeded 
their benefits, in particular for coastal protection. 
The social component arrived at remarkably consistent 
findings. There were only three inconsistencies. First, the 
social component did not identify regional river basin 
management as a key priority. This was mentioned in 
one focus group discussion—farmers complained that 
they were uninformed about upstream dam releases that 
caused flooding for them—but was not highlighted in 
other areas. Second, the social component did not 
consider the costs of hard adaptation options, and so did 
not reach a conclusion that they are often inefficient. 
Third, the social component highlighted the importance 
of improving social safety nets. This potentially falls 
under the category of development institutions, but was 
not explicitly mentioned in the economic study.
DIffeRenTIal VulneRabIl ITY
In all three PSD workshops, and in every institutional 
interview and focus group discussion, people identified 
the elderly, children, single women and female-headed 
households, and the physically handicapped as being the 
most vulnerable. This is because they lack the ability to 
work and thus to earn a sufficient income, the skills 
necessary to engage in self-protective action, and the 
Table 11. keY aDaPTaTIon oPTIons fRoM fIelDwoRk
Centralized Distributed
hard • flood control dikes and levies
• coastal flood control gates
• dams and irrigation channels
• Improved roadways
• Improved communication infrastructure
• Improved hospitals and schools
• more robust buildings
• farm-scale water storage facilities
• deep wells to provide drinking water for people and animals
• Grain storage facilities
• Improved food processing equipment
soft • improved early warning of climatic hazards, and of dam 
releases
• Better planning and management of forest, fish, and 
other natural resources
• Resettlement of populations to lower risk zones
• More credit and financial services for small businesses 
and rural development
• Better education and information for rural areas
• Improved health care, social services, and social support 
for all people
• Better utilization of short-season and drought-resistant crops 
to prepare for drought, floods, and cyclones
• diversification of flood and drought risk by maintaining fields in 
both highland and lowland areas
• Better household and community management and use of 
natural resources, including wild fruits
• practice of soil conservation agriculture
• migration to lower risk areas
• Diversification of livelihoods away from agriculture
• Better planning of how much grain to save for personal 
consumption, and how much to sell for income generation
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assets to withstand extreme weather events. What these 
people need more than anything is an improved social 
safety net, so that they do not use their productive assets 
simply to survive. Several interviewees mentioned that 
the existing level of social support—approximately $4 
per month—is tragically low.
It also emerged that the agriculture sector is far more 
vulnerable than alternative livelihoods. Farmers lose their 
crops from droughts most of all, and then from floods 
and cyclones. The effects of natural hazards on the agri-
cultural sector then trickle through into the other liveli-
hood strategies. They place additional pressure on forests 
and fisheries to feed people when the crops fail, and they 
slow down the flow of money and goods in trade.
Differential vulnerability failed to show up as expected in 
the household survey. While many people in the survey 
claimed—as had the participants in the other activities—
that those with fewer resources were unable to engage in 
self-protective behavior, there were no significant correla-
tions between the indicators of household assets and 
reported past self-protective behavior. It could be that the 
sample size was too small, or the survey design inappro-
priate, or the sampling of households too narrow, to 
capture a differential vulnerability effect. Or, it may 
simply be that the effects of differential vulnerability are 
in fact small. It is worth mentioning that other studies 
have also found that income or assets are not good 
predictors of adaptive behavior, except when they lead to 
households acquiring additional information or skills 
(Phillips 2003; Pratt et al. 2005; Grothmann and 
Reusswig 2006; and Grothmann and Patt 2005) 
Addressing differential vulnerability—if indeed it is a 
major problem—needs to be part of the development 
agenda, simply because that agenda needs to focus on 
interventions that benefit the poorest of the poor. In 
fact, the last few years have witnessed this focus taking 
hold among development agencies (Gupta et al. 2009). 
Hard adaptation options will not achieve this, but social 
development, including strong safety nets, will.
lIMITaTIons of The sTuDY
There are some important limitations to this study, as 
well as lessons learned about how to—and not to—
conduct a country case study such as this. 
First, there has been an insufficient review of the 
current institutional context of adaptation research and 
planning in Mozambique. While this report has 
reviewed the NAPAs, it has omitted detailed descrip-
tions of some other important programs under way. 
SETSAN and FEWS.NET, for example, are engaged in 
a great deal of vulnerability and livelihood mapping, 
with the intention of using this information to reduce 
food insecurity in the face of increasing climate hazards. 
Originally it had been envisioned to interview national-
level stakeholders, and to analyze these programs in 
greater depth. Given unforeseen delays in the study 
process, this did not take place. Since this review of the 
institutional context was not seen as a critical element 
of this report—it describes features unique to 
Mozambique and is difficult to generalize to other 
countries—resources were redirected to the more partic-
ipatory areas of the project. As a result, this component 
of the report is underdeveloped.
Second, there were inconsistent approaches taken 
during the PSD workshops. These had a valid justifica-
tion, namely to observe whether variance in the PSD 
workshop design led to a difference in substantive 
outcome. To a large extent these changes in format were 
the result of post-workshop team discussions, in order 
to “tweak” the workshop design for the next one. 
However, the Xai Xai format—a longer workshop, with 
discussions centered on activities and not geographical 
regions—generated the greatest depth of discussion. 
Thus, some of the most interesting findings are from a 
single workshop, not well-corroborated by the other 
workshops. 
Third, the quality of some of the data is questionable. 
In the case of the PSD workshops, arguably the most 
important single workshop was that held in Maputo, 
with national-level stakeholders. In fact, challenges with 
timing meant that very few high-level stakeholders 
from the national government attended the Maputo 
workshop. The majority of attendees were representa-
tives of NGOs operating in Maputo, some of them with 
very limited knowledge of adaptation policies and prior-
ities. In the case of the institutional interviews and 
focus group discussions, the field notes that served as 
the basis of this report omitted a great deal of detail of 
the discussions. For example, the local consultant’s field 
report (Annex 3) suggests that participants engaged in 
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wealth-ranking exercises to identify the links between 
social groups and adaptive capacity. The field notes 
stated that such wealth-ranking exercises took place, but 
did not provide information about the results. In the 
case of the household survey, the sample size was too 
small to observe significant statistical relationships. 
Adding to this, there were many apparent problems in 
data collection and entry. This consultant simply 
dropped the unexplained answers from the statistical 
analysis, but if the unexplained answers correlated with 
other variables, then this would have introduced bias 
into the results.
Fourth, the depth of analysis of the field data is not as 
great as it should be. Delays in the scheduling of the 
workshops and the fieldwork led to very little time being 
available for the analysis of the data generated there.
How serious are these limitations? Not very; indeed, 
there is good reason to believe the core findings of this 
study would be the same even if each of the problems 
had been resolved. This is because they are so consistent 
with past assessments, and with other results within the 
EACC study. This agreement provides reason to believe 
that improvements in data and analysis would not likely 
have led to qualitatively different findings.
ConClusIons
Finally, it is useful to condense the many findings into a 
core set of key conclusions. These are:
1. Rainfed agriculture takes the hardest direct hit from 
climate hazards. Across the focus group discus-
sions, institutional interviews, and workshops, par-
ticipants mentioned climate impacts affecting a 
variety of livelihood activities, including agricul-
ture, fishing, forestry, and charcoal production. But 
in all cases, the most frequent and severe impacts 
were listed for rain-fed agriculture because of 
droughts. The most frequently mentioned way of 
reducing these impacts was the construction of irri-
gation systems. The most frequently listed barrier 
to this was the lack of finance. Likewise the least 
vulnerable were those households that had man-
aged to diversify their income away from just agri-
culture, such as through informal trade or the 
receipt of remittances from family members living 
in urban areas or in South Africa. But diversifica-
tion isn’t easy: many people suggested that the 
recipients of micro-finance ended up using that 
money just to buy food, because the opportunities 
for small businesses succeeding were not very good. 
This suggests that attention to integrating rural 
areas into markets—including a great deal of atten-
tion to improving transportation and communica-
tion infrastructure—will be an important activity.
2. Subsistence farmers and the economically and 
socially marginalized are the worst off. Across all 
focus group discussions, institutional interviews, 
and workshops, participants identified subsistence 
farmers—and among them the economically and 
socially marginalized individuals—as the most 
vulnerable and having the fewest resources avail-
able to adapt. Economically and socially marginal-
ized individuals include the elderly, orphans, 
widows and female heads of households, and the 
physically handicapped. Most communities are 
lacking support networks for these people, either 
formally through the government or informally 
through well-functioning social networks. The 
government assistance that the particularly needy 
receive is inadequate to help them make it through 
adverse weather events. Social safety nets need to 
be improved.
3. Policies and institutions should enforce sustainable 
resource management and wise land-use planning. 
In many cases, participants in the discussions and 
workshops suggested that the harvesting of forest 
resources—such as wood for charcoal produc-
tion—as well as fishing were important income-
generating activities, which often helped to buffer 
shocks to agricultural productivity. But these 
activities are suffering due to deforestation and 
overfishing. Better management is needed. This 
can include the enforcement of existing laws and 
government policies, as well as improving the 
capacity of community associations to manage 
local resources effectively. Planning is also needed 
to make sure that activities gradually move from 
those areas of high risk to areas of lower risk.
4. Knowledge is needed across the board. Lack of 
knowledge is a problem in several respects. First, 
there appeared to be a great deal of confusion 
about the causes of natural disasters and whether 
they would increase or decrease in the future. 
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Education is needed so that people can expect 
disasters to be a constant feature in the future. 
Second, people need technical assistance concern-
ing better land management, such as conservation 
agriculture. Third, people need access to real-time 
weather forecasts—effective early warning—to 
mitigate their losses to f loods and cyclones. In 
some cases, they also need information about when 
dam operators upstream will be releasing water, so 
that they can prepare for the local f looding this 
causes. Fourth, and most importantly, people need 
more education in general, if they are to diversify 
their livelihoods away from agriculture and toward 
high value-added activities that can enhance their 
well-being and provide them the resources to 
withstand extreme weather.
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aPPenDIxes
aPPenDIx 1. InTeResTIng ResulTs fRoM InDIVIDual foCus gRouP DIsCussIons
Location Participants
Interesting lessons on social differentiation 
and income Interesting lessons on vulnerability and adaptation
Angoche Elderly and 
handicapped
the poorest group comprise 11 percent of 
population
government support to them of 100 
metecaix ($4) a month is totally inadequate
social protection network exists
people with more diversified incomes are in a better 
position
there is one guy with a really strong house, and people 
go to him when cyclones come; more such houses are 
needed
Angoche fishermen 
with boats
fish are no longer available in large 
quantities
people use mosquito nets for fishing, which 
deplete fish stocks
people help each other to reconstruct after a 
storm
need to establish a fishing association to manage the 
resource better
cyclones and strong winds are the big threat, because 
of the destruction to houses, boats, and coconut trees
no forecasts of adverse weather
men and young people are better at adapting
need to stop cutting the mangroves
Angoche subsistence 
farmers
fishing and agriculture are main sources of 
income
Elderly, single women, widows suffer most
cyclones are biggest hazard, destroying houses and 
boats
wealthier people have built stronger houses that can 
withstand storms
need cash to build better homes
Angoche fishermen fishing and selling fish are the main income 
activities
cyclones lead to hunger and disease
maybe need to move to a safer area
Buzi subsistence 
farmers
Associations exist in the community
widows are the most vulnerable group
increasing hardship over last 10 years
drought happens annually; locust plague was a recent 
problem
Buzi charcoal 
producers
Access to trees to fell is determined by 
relevant permits
nobody can adapt to cyclones
chibabava subsistence 
farmers
no cooperatives
Agriculture and labor are main income 
sources
need better inputs for agriculture (tractors, 
etc.)
natural disasters would become less common if they 
could hold more traditional ceremonies
need to build dams and irrigation, better homes, and 
homes on higher ground
Continued on next page
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Location Participants
Interesting lessons on social differentiation 
and income Interesting lessons on vulnerability and adaptation
chibabava small 
business 
people
no social protection network or association 
exists in the community
this group works in beekeeping
subsistence farmers, elderly, orphans are 
the most vulnerable
need to get access to 7 billion 
people can stock up on food to prepare for drought, 
using money obtained from selling charcoal
working age people have the greatest adaptive capacity
climate hazards occurring because of rapid 
deforestation
chibabava subsistence 
farmers
no social protection network or associations 
exist in the community
Agriculture and charcoal production are the 
main sources of income
need to build better houses to prepare for floods and 
cyclones
chibabava subsistence 
farmers
no social protection network exists
there are activist associations
community controls the firewood resource
Repairing broken water pumps would be a good 
adaptation
tree planting is needed
future well-being will either get worse or better, nobody 
can predict
chibuto widows and 
single 
mothers
no cooperatives in community
no paid work
Agriculture and lake fishing are main income 
sources, also charcoal production
desperately need alternative sources of income
chibuto community 
leaders
Agriculture and livestock are main activities. 
Also fishing and selling rush matting
problems are lack of health post, electricity, and paved 
roads
Believe that deforestation is causing the natural 
disasters
Believe that climate conditions will improve over next 10 
years
need early warning
chókwe widows An association exists for wood harvesting 
and baking
charcoal is the main source of income
orphans and elderly are the most vulnerable 
widows represent 30 percent of population
microcredit to help people start small businesses and 
diversify income, but small businesses are also tough to 
work, and loaned money is often used to buy food
technical assistance is needed
chókwe Elderly men Young men go to south Africa for work, 
leaving women behind to run the farm
Remittances from south Africa are important
widows represent 30 percent of population
forecast of drought and flood has not been forthcoming
Unassisted elderly people have the hardest time 
adapting
mabote farmers Agricultural production, including 
beekeeping, is the biggest activity
drought is biggest threat
people have pulled together after disasters
mabote Elderly Agriculture, ranching, and forestry are the 
main income activities
the elderly are the only ones who cannot 
adapt
drought is caused by climate change, which is caused 
by deforestation
there isn’t even enough drinking water
mabote old women 
and widows
Agriculture and charcoal production are the 
main income-generating activities
they suffer from a lack of mobile telephone coverage
water shortages are so severe that there is no water for 
people and cattle to drink.
Better storage of grain would help smooth out the hard 
times
Continued on next page
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Location Participants
Interesting lessons on social differentiation 
and income Interesting lessons on vulnerability and adaptation
mabote leaders A savings association exists that supports 
elderly and orphans
the young people often leave to seek work 
elsewhere
Elderly subsistence farmers are the most 
vulnerable
main problems are a lack of wells, lack of health care, 
and lack of roads
tree planting for charcoal production is needed
manhiça Elderly 
women and 
widows
little solidarity
lots of people go to south Africa
farming, charcoal, and cattle are biggest 
income sources
droughts dry up the wells, leaving even no water for 
drinking
You can’t adapt if there isn’t any water
need to diversify income
manhiça leaders no social protection
people travel to south Africa
farming, charcoal, and hunting are main 
income sources; also beekeeping
planting trees to increase charcoal production
deforestation is a big problem, and seen as causing 
droughts and flooding
massingir charcoal 
producers
Association for tree felling and charcoal 
production exists
lack of social services is a key problem, 
especially a health post
lack of water even for human consumption, as well as 
for cattle, because the wells have dried up
without enough water, no adaptation is possible
massingir needy 
women
no social protection network people travel to south Africa to escape the lack of water 
at home
constructing a dam would be good
not entirely convinced that hazards result from failure to 
observe traditional ceremonies
matutuine leaders forestry and farming are main activities
Elderly and orphans are most vulnerable
the worst affected is the entire population
lack of electricity is a problem
flooding is annual when dams upstream opens its sluice 
gates. the dam in south Africa sometimes informs them 
in advance, the one in swaziland does not
need more traditional ceremonies to ward off drought
matutuine widows and 
single 
mothers
no social protection for the elderly
new association formed to share in farming 
work
main income is working in south Africa and 
swaziland, farming, and forestry
poor access roads and lack of facilities to buy basic 
products
no differentiation in terms of adaptive capacity
need more dams, irrigation, and technical assistance
moatize subsistence 
farmers
Agriculture and fishing are main income 
sources
Big problem is being eaten by crocodiles when farming 
low-lying land
need to build irrigation canals, and avoid cutting down 
trees for charcoal
moatize subsistence 
farmers
cooperatives of small businesses and 
fishermen exist
Agriculture and fishing are main sources of 
income
need better road access, a health center, and police
people do receive weather forecasts over the radio, and 
suffer less than in the past
need tools, and motor-driven pumps for irrigation
no differences between groups in terms of adaptive 
capacity
moatize subsistence 
farmers
subsistence farmers are the most 
vulnerable, because they go hungry with 
drought
people try traditional ceremonies to avoid droughts, but 
these don’t seem to work
Burnings are a big problem
mopeia subsistence 
farmers
going to cities to work has increased 
standard of living – the young can do this
no associations in the community
small business owners have highest 
incomes, subsistence farmers the lowest
flooding is the main hazard
canoes are being built
farming should be in the lowland during drought periods
Continued on next page
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Location Participants
Interesting lessons on social differentiation 
and income Interesting lessons on vulnerability and adaptation
mopeia subsistence 
farmers
no social protection networks
Associations to market food have been 
successful at getting people income and 
raising standards of living
lack of market and access roads are major concern; 
there are no people to buy their products
hazards occur because of witchcraft
problems from natural hazards will improve in next 10 
years
morrumbala subsistence 
farmers
Association exists
Agriculture and casual labor are primary 
sources of income, with fishing as well
hazards occur because of failures of ancestors
frequent floods and droughts
to protect against drought, farm in the lowlands, to 
protect against flood, farm in the highland
cVm has provided the most assistance
morrumbala subsistence 
farmers
subsistence farmers the most vulnerable want to construct dikes to protect against floods.
flooding is the most frequent event, followed by drought
need to have two machambas, one high and one low
morrumbala subsistence 
farmers
no social protection network in the 
community
most people are subsistence farmers, who 
are the most vulnerable
people living in stronger built houses do not 
suffer as much
hippos have reduced agricultural production, along with 
floods
floods destroy all their property
situation would improve if the climate would change to 
have fewer natural disasters
cyclones and drought also a problem
Vilanculo farmers no associations or cooperatives
most vulnerable are elderly, single mothers, 
and children
fraud has led to unequal distribution of food 
aid
main problems are lack of information and transportation
drought is main hazard
hazards have increased because of failure to follow 
local customs
do not receive radio weather forecasts
Vilanculo community 
leaders
community has suffered a loss of social and 
moral values
no associations in community
children suffer most
illegal tree felling is a problem
lack of organization is the main barrier to community 
adaptation
food for work program is mentioned many times as 
important
zavala community 
leaders
no cooperatives
Elderly and children are most vulnerable
planting fruit trees helps
no formal forecasts available, but traditional indicators
women most able to adapt
need to focus more on raising and selling animals
zavala subsistence 
farmers
people here don’t travel
lots of conflicts between families
Agriculture and ranching the main income 
sources
need to increase the area under cultivation
need more organization and knowledge
cyclones are worst hazard, along with drought
zavala widows and 
elderly 
farmers
people here don’t travel
no social solidarity or cooperatives
Agriculture is biggest income source
need more water pumps
lack of rain because have failed to do the traditional 
ceremonies
need early warning
families that receive remittances are most able to adapt
Better employment opportunities are needed
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aPPenDIx 3. fIelD RePoRT 
subMITTeD oCTobeR 5,2009, bY 
Raul VaRela
baCkgRounD 
The purpose of the study was to create an environment 
for understanding economic adaptation to climatic 
changes and to generate recommendations for subse-
quent actions leading to better interventions to mitigate 
and adapt to the effects of this phenomenon. Particular 
concerns are with fragile livelihood groups, mainly those 
households and communities with high exposure to 
natural hazards.
 In order to address such concerns, it becomes impor-
tant that a consistent criteria be adopted in the selection 
process to visualize geographical zones that allow us to 
grasp, confidently, representatives of all livelihood 
groups followed by an in-depth analysis of their level of 
adaptation to the effects of climatic changes, formal and 
traditional interventions, level of resilience, intervention 
gaps and cost benefit analysis of additional actions to 
overcome the problem in a short, mid and long term 
perspectives.
The WB recommendation is that the geographical 
zones-hotspots be defined based on the combination of 
three factors: agro-ecologic zones (geographical patterns 
defined based on combinations of soil characteristic, 
rainfall pattern, vegetations, agriculture potential and 
environmental conditions)1; physical aspects (key natu-
ral events that may expose households and communities 
at risk of natural hazard)2; social or socioeconomic 
aspects (key elements at disposal and affecting house-
hold’s wellbeing that can be translated as combined 
factors influencing household levels of wealth, food 
security and nutrition, health and sanitation)3.
In order to address the above concerns and instruction 
provided by the World Bank and by taking into 
account that adaptation to climatic changes is intrinsi-
cally linked to anthropogenic multi-factors, a frame-
work was laid out to capture the cause-effect 
relationship among anthropogenic factors integrating 
agro-ecologic factors with physical and social aspects. 
As a result of this, it was possible to identify six zones 
as well as physical hotspot with respect to climatic 
changes. In addition, elements related to food security 
and nutrition, poverty indicators as well issues related 
to health were integrated for a final definition of 
geographical hotspot.
With this background, the study was conducted in three 
stages:
• Definition of hotspots
• Three workshops(two regional and one national)
• Fieldwork at representative geographical zones
• Analyses and presentation of overall trends
1  IIAM had set up 10 agro-ecologic zones
2  For Mozambican context, drought, cyclone, flood and sea level rise are 
the most common hazards
3  For the purpose of this study, food security, health and nutrition, 
HIV-AIDS and poverty should be the most relevant socioeconomic 
factors.
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The present report specifically addresses only issues 
related to the fieldwork and it will deal with instru-
ments, geographical coverage, procedures and activities 
carried out after fieldwork.
fIelDwoRk
Fieldwork was initially planned to be conducted by local 
enumerators under the supervision of three junior 
university graduates. The proposed approach was to 
assure high quality work because that way we could use 
local knowledge, control language constraints and carry 
out a more in depth survey, particularly with respect to 
identification and characterization of livelihood groups. 
However, after various attempts to go to the field, 
which was postponed for three or four times due to 
administrative reasons, the decision was that fieldwork 
was going to be conducted by two junior students under 
the supervision of the local technical coordinator.
Thus, the approach was as follows: 
• In each district, the team recruited one local staff, 
preferably, one of the participants who attended the 
regional workshop to be part of the exercise.
• In each administrative post, assistance was also pro-
vided by a technical staff who played the role of 
facilitator as well as translator.
Instruments
The purpose of fieldwork was to cross check informa-
tion from the desk review as well as to gather insights 
on climatic changes at local level, particularly with 
respect to livelihood groups and individual household. 
Furthermore, it was important to gather perception 
from different institutions and civil society about expo-
sure to climatic changes, sensitivity, and adaptation, 
including extreme coping mechanisms, which would 
complement information already compiled from the 
three workshops. Therefore, three instruments were 
developed:
1. Household questionnaire – was divided in 4 
sections: 
• Sociodemographic information
• Agriculture performance and income source
• Shocks and coping strategies
• Climatic Changes and Vulnerability, which 
include exposure, sensitivity, resilience and 
adaptation as well as institutional and 
community s´ performance and perception about 
climatic changes.
2. Institutional questionnaire – organized in four parts:
• Institution profile, which included the identifi-
cation of area of intervention, group entitlement 
and partnerships.
• Institutional perception about risk including 
identification/recall of past events, the effects on 
different social groups, likely chance of repeti-
tion and lesson learnt.
• Sensitivity, which deals with perception about 
events, preventive measures and action for 
mitigation.
• Inventory of adaptation (prevention, adaptation 
and mitigation done by the community and 
institutions) and constraints.
3. Focus Groups – This instrument was designed to 
capture information about various social groups and 
to understand common perception of groups about 
climatic changes, variations on adaptation and sense 
about future events. This included wealth ranking 
exercise and specific interview with the representa-
tive of part of the identified social groups.
Once designed, the instrument was pre-tested and, 
thereafter, it was adjusted for the final version. It is 
important to mention that the results of the various 
workshops were also keen for the final adjustment of 
the instruments because they were carried out before 
fieldwork, 
spatial Representation
During the preliminary exercise, six zones sensitive to 
the climatic changes were identified. Later on, they 
were combined with the definition of hotspots, which 
were crucial for the identification of zones for fieldwork. 
However, such definition had to be done by taking into 
account administrative boundaries. All zones were 
covered and regional variations (inland and coastal) as 
well as population density were taken into account
As per the map, a total of 7 out of 10 provinces were 
visited of which 2 in the North, 2 in the Center and 3 
in the South. 
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Procedures
The following steps were followed:
• At District Level
• Upon arrival in each district, the team met with 
local administrator and his/her staff to explain 
the purpose of the mission and to gather pre-
liminary background about agenda on climatic 
changes, past events, and evidences of risks and 
adaptation.
• Additionally, the team met with various insti-
tutions to fill out the questionnaire about cli-
matic changes. When it was possible, 
separated interviews were conducted with offi-
cial institutions and then with NGOs or, oth-
erwise together. Such procedure was intended 
to control for biases and for crosschecking 
information about the same issue. Overall, 
this was a good opportunity to discuss various 
insights about institutional perception on cli-
matic changes in terms of: exposures; 
sensitivity and adaptation; individual action 
taken to mitigate the problem; perception 
about outlooks.
• One of the objectives of the above mentioned 
meetings was to discuss spatial variations 
about types of climatic change exposures, 
population density, examples of adaptation 
and variations on exposure to risk. For a prac-
tical purpose, participants usually described 
the characteristics of various administrative 
posts4.
• After the discussions, the team, consensually, 
selected two administrative posts to be part of 
the study. In general, the selection of theses 
posts was done after an in-depth discussion 
about past events, exposure and sensitivity of 
each post and, thereafter, the selection was 
made.
• At Administrative Post
• Meetings were held with the population of dif-
ferent social strata as well as with traditional 
authorities.
• The discussion started with an introduction 
about the purpose of the mission, its neutrality 
in addressing the issue and clarification that 
there were no political, economic gains or even 
commitments neither from the organization nor 
for follow up of projects or programs.
• Following that, discussion about socioeconomy 
of administrative post linked to climatic 
changes took place. The combination of these 
two elements guided the direction of the dis-
cussion that was often supported by various 
techniques of participatory approach and com-
munity development.
• Once again, a clear picture about socioeconomic 
variation and climatic change exposures at local 
level were addressed. This was a good opportu-
nity to select the 2 “localidades5” should be 
visited.
4  Geographical/administrative units below districts. In average each 
district has two to four administrative post and each administrative 
post has about three “localidades”
5  There is wider variation among localidades in terms of livelihood and 
social organization as well as exposure to the climatic changes. Some 
localidades were in the very coastal area and typically linked to fishery, 
while others were in the interior and mainly subject to subsistence 
agriculture.
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• Wealth Ranking
• The meeting at administrative posts was com-
pleted with the exercise of wealth ranking to 
identify and characterize livelihood groups as 
well as their proportion and distribution within 
the “localidade”. Typical items (i.e. maize, vari-
ous types of beans, stones and other local items) 
were used based on their value/role to charac-
terize livelihood groups. Such exercise was well 
taken by the populations who embraced it and 
participated actively; therefore, the team 
became mere facilitators.
• As a result, there was a general perception that 
we could find concentration of various liveli-
hood groups at one “localidade” and, based on 
that, the team selected two localidades for hh 
and focus group interviews.
• At localidade
As per table 1, a total of 24 Administrative Posts and 28 
localidades were visited. In each localidade, the follow-
ing took place: 15 HH interviews with representatives 
of various identified livelihood groups; 3 focus inter-
views; 1 institutional. 
In some cases, purposive interviews were conducted to 
capture and enhance social variation, despite the fact 
that they were not identified during the wealth ranking 
exercise (i.e. gender issue, widows, orphan child as head 
of HH).
Post-field Visit
• Data Cleaning and Post-Coding
A total of 137 HH questionnaires were completed as 
well as 18 institutional and 45 focus interviews. Due to 
the fact that there were close and open questions in the 
questionnaires, there was a need for the revision and 
post-coding. This exercise took longer than expected 
because only two junior collaborators under my supervi-
sion were carrying out the task. They spent about six 
days on that task.
• Data Entry
A database had to be designed in order to enter the 
data. For that, the supervisor worked closely with 
technicians to go over each part of the questionnaire to 
make sure that everything was accordingly. CSPro was 
the selected software because it will allow data to be 
entered friendly and can be easily transferred either to 
SPSS or Excell.
focus Interviews and Institutional questionnaires
The post-coding was difficult due to a wide variation of 
responses, even though, a template was designed for 
that purpose. To counteract the problem, the option was 
to write a synthesis, which, at this stage, is all in 
Portuguese, but if needed, it can be translated.
lesson learnt
Overall, the results for all the components of this study 
were very interesting. However, they could have been 
much better. Several issues prevented us from getting 
greater results and they are highlighted below:
• Contrary to what happened in other countries, the 
study in Mozambique did not have any institutional 
integration at all. Not only that, but Mozambique 
lacked a multi-disciplinary core team. 
• Theoretically, the study had a national coordina-
tor. Even though we recognize all her effort, she 
was overloaded with other work and often away 
from Mozambique and, thus, she could not follow 
all the day-to-day activities. Furthermore, her 
relationship with WB was not all clear at all, 
which often created some difficulties when she 
needed to drawn upon support from the 
organization.
• The team had also a technical coordinator who was 
away from the country at both initial phase and 
fieldwork. If he were here, he could have made a 
difference and many issues could have been dealt 
with more profoundly. Thus, this led to some limi-
tations on addressing technical issues. 
• There was limited consensus in terms of procedures, 
methodologies and overall technical aspects. Often, 
what was produced in the ground was not totally 
integrated or taken into account. For example, 
issues on socioeconomic aspects, including poverty 
and food security and nutrition were not well inte-
grated with climatic changes, even though, some 
very good materials were produced.
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• Resource allocation and very limited support from 
WB office in Mozambique made it difficult to 
implement the activities. 
• Often, the team was asked to prepare agenda with 
chronograms, budget and procedures, which were 
often changed for more than once. Such situation 
interfered with the consultant’s scheduled and 
made planning difficult. This was particularly 
aggravated by great delays (i.e. fieldwork) which 
made it impossible to carry out the work smoothly 
and; in some cases, it generated conflicts with 
respect to the record of number of days on consul-
tancy work.
Overall, this activity was quite an experience and useful 
to exchange ideas and to shape up methodologies to 
bring about outstanding results on economic costs of 
adaptation to climatic changes.
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